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I. Introduction
New York has a long and proud tradition of state constitu-
tionalism. 1 That tradition continues today.2 Indeed, with state
1. See generally Vincent M. Bonventre, State Constitutionalism in New York: A
Non-Reactive Tradition, 2 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 32 (1989). See also Edward S.
Corwin, The Extension of Judicial Review in New York: 1783-1905, 15 MICH. L. REV. 281
(1917); Peter J. Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and Protection of Defendants'
Rights: The Case of New York, 1960-1978, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 157 (1979).
2. See Bonventre, supra note 1, at 55, et seq. See also Sol Wachtler, Our Constitu-
tions - Alive and Well, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 381 (1987); Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitu-
tionalism in Practice and Principle, 42 RECORD Ass'N. BAR CITY N.Y. 288 (41st Benjamin
N. Cardozo Lecture, 1987).
To be sure, this tradition of state constitutional decision-making at the Court of
Appeals has not been uniformly, or even predominantly, "liberal", as that term is com-
monly applied. See, e.g., infra notes 7-39 and accompanying text. See also Vincent M.
Bonventre, State Constitutional Recession: The New York Court of Appeals Re-
trenches, 4 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 1 (1991). But the New York court has histori-
cally exercised independent judgment - i.e., it has not simply relied on federal case
law - in deciding rights and liberties issues under state law. Moreover, the court has
typically done so as a matter of course, not merely in isolated periods or in cases reacting
to trends or specific decisions at the Supreme Court. See People v. Barber, 289 N.Y. 378,
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constitutional law enjoying a "renaissance" ' throughout the na-
tion in response to the retrenchment in civil rights and liberties
at the Supreme Court during the Burger-Rehnquist era,' leading
commentators view the New York Court of Appeals as being in
the forefront.5 An annual examination of state constitutional de-
velopments at New York's highest tribunal thus seems particu-
larly appropriate. Needless to say, as one who has great respect
for the court, the author is pleased to inaugurate this Court of
Appeals - State Constitutional Law Review.
The purpose here is not to review developments in criminal
procedure, administrative law, family law, or other areas of the
law that also happen to involve the state constitution. The focus
here is on New York's fundamental law - its application, in-
terpretation and development - regardless of its substantive
context in a particular case. More specifically, this article exam-
ines the adjudication of rights and liberties at New York's high-
est tribunal, the Court of Appeals, to the extent such decision-
making is based on this state's independent - i.e., non-
federal - supreme law.' Among the matters to be examined are
384, 46 N.E.2d 329, 331 (1943) (Lehman, C.J.) (emphasis added):
[Plarenthetically we may point out that in determining the scope and effect of
the guarantees of fundamental rights of the individual in the Constitution of the
State of New York, this court is bound to exercise its independent judgment and
is not bound by a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States limiting the
scope of similar guarantees in the Constitution of the United States.
3. See A. E. Dick Howard, The Renaissance of State Constitutional Law, 1 EMERG-
ING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 1 (1988). See also Robert Force, State "Bills of Rights": A Case
of Neglect and the Need for a Renaissance, 3 VAL. U. L. REV. 125 (1969).
4. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of
State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 547-48
(1986). See also A. E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day
of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873 (1976); Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus - Constitu-
tional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165 (1984).
5. See William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Chief Judge Charles S. Desmond, 36
BUFF. L. REV. 1, 3 (1987) (the New York Court of Appeals is "the acknowledged leader");
Peter J. Galie, State Supreme Courts, Judicial Federalism and the Other Constitutions,
71 JUDICATURE 100, 103 (Aug.-Sept. 1987) (the Court of Appeals "made the largest num-
ber of state-based rights decisions going beyond federal law of any state in the nation" in
the year under study, 1986); Ronald K.L. Collins, quoted in Elizabeth Kolbert, On
Rights, New York Looks to State, Not U.S., Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1990, at Al ("the
New York Court is in the forefront").
6. There are, to be sure, some fascinating constitutional developments in Court of
Appeals case law that either do not deal directly with individual rights and liberties or
aie not based on state law. These are not covered here. Among the most notable of such
1992]
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the court's approaches to constitutional issues, the sources from
which it derives fundamental law, the constitutional direction of
the court, the public law jurisprudence and views of its individ-
ual members, and the philosophical tensions among them as re-
flected in their separate opinions.
Part II of this article, The Cases, reviews the state constitu-
tional developments in the areas of criminal justice and civil lib-
erties and equality, respectively. Part III, The Court, examines
tabulations of the Court of Appeals' state constitutional deci-
excluded cases are: City of New York v. State of New York, 76 N.Y.2d 479, 562 N.E.2d
118, 561 N.Y.S.2d 154 (1990); In re Raquel Marie X., 76 N.Y.2d 387, 559 N.E.2d 418, 559
N.Y.S.2d 855, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 517 (1990); In re Lionel F., 76 N.Y.2d 747, 558
N.E.2d 30, 559 N.Y.S.2d 228, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 304 (1990); Cahill v. Public Service
Commission, 76 N.Y.2d 102, 556 N.E.2d 133, 556 N.Y.S.2d 840, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
344 (1990). In City of New York v. State of New York, the court examined the home rule
(N.Y. CONST., art. IX, § 2(b)(2)) implications of a special law placing a referendum on the
ballot in Staten Island for the voters there to decide whether a commission should be
established to study how the borough might secede from New York City and become a
city itself. 76 N.Y.2d 479, 483, 562 N.E.2d 118, 119, 561 N.Y.S.2d 154, 155. The majority,
in an unsigned per curiam opinion, held that the referendum was aimed only at an ex-
ploratory procedure, with no binding force upon New York City, and, therefore, did not
interfere with local property, affairs or government such as would trigger the constitu-
tional requirement for a home rule message by the legislature. Id. at 486, 562 N.E.2d at
120, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 156. In dissent, Judge Hancock, joined by Judge Alexander, argued
that home rule was indeed implicated because of the "direct and immediate impact on
the personnel, finances and administration of the city" that would necessarily follow ap-
proval of the referendum. Id. at 488, 562 N.E.2d at 122, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 158 (Hancock,
J., dissenting). In In re Raquel Marie X., the court, in a unanimous opinion by Judge
Kaye, relying solely on the Federal Constitution, strengthened an unwed father's right to
consent to the adoption of his child, by striking the requirement in Domestic Relations
Law § 111 (1)(e) that conditioned that right on the father's living together with the
child's mother for six continuous months prior to the child's placement for adoption.
The court reasoned that an unwed father might well establish his parental responsibility
for the child regardless of whether he satisfied the "living together" prerequisite. 76
N.Y.2d 387, 406, 559 N.E.2d 418, 427, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855, 863 (1990). In Cahill v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, the court, speaking through Judge Bellacosa, held that the federal first
amendment rights of ratepayers were violated by a policy permitting utilities to pass
along to them the costs of the utilities charitable contributions. 76 N.Y.2d 102, 114, 556
N.E.2d 133, 138, 556 N.Y.S.2d 840, 845 (1990); In In re Lionel F., the court, in an un-
signed memorandum opinion over the partial dissent of Judge Alexander who was joined
by Judge Titone, held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the federal constitution was
not violated by a Family Court ruling which, in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, first
granted a defense motion to dismiss certain counts, but then, upon reconsideration, va-
cated the ruling while the proceeding was still pending, while the remainder of the mo-
tion to dismiss was still under advisement, and before the evidence was closed. The ear-
lier dismissal was thus not, in the court's view, tantamount to an acquittal. 76 N.Y.2d at
749, 558 N.E.2d at 31, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 229 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss1/1
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sions and the individual judges' votes to determine the court's
record on rights and liberties issues, as well as the voting pat-
terns and alignments of its members.
II. The Cases
A. Criminal Justice: Substantive Rights
1. Right to Counsel
State constitutional law is not always "liberal. ' '7 Reliance on
the state constitution, rather than the federal, does not necessa-
rily signal a state court's intention to extend individual rights
and liberties.' Indeed, the first decision reviewed here, one of the
most significant criminal justice rulings in New York in recent
years, illustrates the' Court of Appeals - much like the post-
Warren Supreme Court -- "retrenching"" from a prior rights-
protective position.
In People v. Bing,10 the New York court sharply curtailed
its own expansive right to counsel rule.1" Under the so-called
"derivative right to counsel" rule 12 adopted by the court in Peo-
ple v. Bartolomeo,1" a suspect represented by counsel on a prior
pending charge could not, in the absence of that attorney, be
questioned on a new unrelated charge, even if the suspect did
not wish to consult with an attorney on the new charge.1' This
7. See Barry Latzer, The Hidden Conservatism of the State Court "Revolution", 74
JUDICATURE 190 (Dec.-Jan. 1991). See also Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet - Justice
Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional Law, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 429,
433 (1988); Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63
TEx. L. REv. 1081 (1985).
The terms "liberal" and "conservative" are used throughout in their conventional
sense in judicial studies. See supra notes 331-32.
8. See Vincent M. Bonventre, Beyond the Reemergence - "Inverse Incorpora-
tion" and Other Prospects for State Constitutional Law, 53 ALB. L. REV. 403, 412-15
(1989).
9. See generally Bonventre, State Constitutional Recession: The New York Court
of Appeals Retrenches, 4 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 1 (1991).
10. 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990).
11. See generally Peter J. Galie, supra note 1, at 178-86 (outlining the development
of New York's right to counsel rule). See also Bonventre, supra note 1, at 45-49; Peter J.
Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among State Supreme Courts, 33
SYRACUSE L. REv. 731, 764 (1982).
12. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 337, 558 N.E.2d at 1014, 559 N.Y.S. at 477.
13. 53 N.Y.2d 225, 423 N.E.2d 371, 440 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1981).
14. Id. at 231, 423 N.E.2d at 374, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
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rule - actually a derivative "indelible"15 right to counsel
rule - was overruled in 1990 in Bing."6
Judge Simons, who authored the comprehensive opinion for
a four-judge majority, while noting that the court has long "pro-
vided protection to accuseds far more expansive" than federally
mandated,1 7 nevertheless explained:
[The right to counsel] recognized must rest on some principled
basis which justifies its social cost. Bartolomeo has no such basis.
It rests on a fictional attorney-client relationship derived from a
prior charge [when, in fact,] Bartolomeo defendants have waived
their right to counsel and chosen not to hire a lawyer to represent
them on the new unrelated charge. Indeed, they have done so af-
ter receiving the benefit of legal advice and after at least one prior
experience dealing with the authorities."
Outlining the development of the derivative right to counsel
in New York, the majority in Bing recounted how the decision in
Bartolomeo had, without explanation, contravened a line of
precedents - including one only four months old at the
time 9 -- specifically rejecting the notion of an indelible right to
counsel on new unrelated charges.2 0 Further, according to the
Bing majority, the change wrought by Bartolomeo made little
sense. Persistent offenders, who were likely to be represented al-
ready on some pending charge, were thereby immunized from
any questioning on new charges; they were thus provided a veri-
table "dispensation" under Bartolomeo." As a result, the major-
15. The term "indelible" has been used to describe that aspect of the New York rule
providing that, once attached, the right to counsel cannot be waived, regardless of how
voluntary, knowing, understanding and deliberate, unless counsel is present. The rule
was first announced in a two-paragraph opinion by Chief Judge Fuld in People v. Vella,
21 N.Y.2d 249, 234 N.E.2d 422, 287 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1967), reaffirmed in strong terms in
People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 328-29, 239 N.E.2d 537, 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663, 665-66
(1968), and subsequently dubbed the "indelible" right by Judge Cooke, beginning in
People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 165, 385 N.E.2d 612, 618, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 881 (1978).
16. 76 N.Y.2d 331, 337, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1014, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474, 477 (1990).
17. Id. at 339, 558 N.E.2d at 1015, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
18. Id. at 349, 558 N.E.2d at 1021, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
19. People v. Kazmarick, 52 N.Y.2d 322, 329, 420 N.E.2d 45, 49, 438 N.Y.S.2d 247,
251 (1981). See also People v. Taylor 27 N.Y.2d 327, 330-32, 266 N.E.2d 630, 631-33, 318
N.Y.S.2d 1, 3-4 (1971).
20. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 340-41, 558 N.E.2d at 1016, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 479. See also
People v. Kazmarick, 52 N.Y.2d 322, 420 N.E.2d 45, 438 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1981).
21. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 342, 558 N.E.2d at 1017, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 480 (quoting
[Vol. 12:1
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ity continued, Bartolomeo caused considerable difficulty in sub-
sequent cases, it was applied unevenly by the court, and it was
gradually diluted into a rule prohibiting little more than deliber-
ate police oversight of the fact that a defendant was already rep-
resented on a prior charge. 2
Finally, the majority noted that the rationale for
Bartolomeo was not even articulated until the court's decision,
seven years later, in People v. Robles.'3 There, the court ex-
plained that the derivative right to counsel on a new charge was
intended only to safeguard the right to counsel on the prior
pending charge." ' But if that is the rationale, Judge Simons
asked in his Bing decision, then why not exclude the defendant's
statements only in the prosecution of the prior pending
charge?"5 Finding no justification for continuing such a problem-
riddled and exception-tattered rule, the majority concluded that
Bartolomeo should be overruled. 6
Disagreeing strenuously, Judge Kaye, joined by Judges Al-
exander and Titone, argued that the Bartolomeo rule was the
"product of the careful, considered implementation of three
guarantees of our State Constitution due process, the privilege
against self-incrimination, and the right to assistance of counsel
"27 "Today," Judge Kaye lamented, "the court breaks with
its proud tradition ....
Bartolomeo, in Kaye's view, was not an "aberrant deci-
sion."'2 9 Rather, it was one of a long line of cases premised on the
concept of "fundamental fairness," 30 intended to rectify the in-
herent imbalance in custodial settings where an accused is sub-
ject to the awesome power of the state. In such settings, only the
presence of an attorney can ensure that the defendant's waiver
Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225, 239, 423 N.E.2d 374, 385, 440 N.Y.S.2d 894, 909 (1981)
(Wachtler, J., dissenting)).
22. Id. at 342-43, 558 N.E.2d at 1017, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
23. 72 N.Y.2d 689, 691, 533 N.E.2d 240, 242, 536 N.Y.S.2d 401, 403 (1988). See Bing,
76 N.Y.2d at 343-44, 558 N.E.2d at 1018, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 481.
24. See Robles, 72 N.Y.2d at 698, 533 N.E.2d at 244, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 405.
25. See Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 341, 558 N.E.2d at 1016-17, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 478-79.
26. Id. at 350, 558 N.E.2d at 1022, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
27. Id. at 351, 558 N.E.2d at 1023, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 486 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 352, 558 N.E.2d at 1023, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
30. Id.
1992]
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of constitutional rights is competent, intelligent and voluntary.3 1
As for the majority's contrary contentions, Judge Kaye noted
that those arguments had been pressed by the dissenters in
Bartolomeo and were, in that case, rejected by the court.3 2
"That there are now four votes for those same rejected policy
considerations," Judge Kaye lectured, "is, of course, not a valid
reason to overrule the case."'33
In his rejoinder for the majority, however, Judge Simons
was emphatic:
As noted at the outset of this opinion, our right to counsel rules
are based on (common sense and fairness) .... But'there is little
to be said for a rule which is not firmly grounded on prior case
law, cannot be applied uniformly, favors recidivists over first-time
arrestees, and exacts such a heavy cost from the public.34
The New York right to counsel was further trimmed in Peo-
ple v. Davis.35 There, the court, again speaking through Judge
Simons, limited the "indelibility" of that right by holding that a
suspect who initially requests an attorney in a non-custodial set-
ting could, thereafter, even when in custody, waive her constitu-
tional rights without the attorney being present." The court,
this time unanimous, explained that the rule of indelibility was
intended to provide a buffer between the suspect and the espe-
cially coercive power of the state in a custodial setting.3 7 Such
coercive power, the court reasoned, is absent where the suspect,
at the time she requests an attorney, is not in custody. The need
for counsel in that circumstance is substantially diminished.38
The court's rationale - advanced to permit a custodial waiver
or withdrawal of such a request for counsel - evoked no
dissent. 9
31. Id. at 352, 558 N.E.2d at 1024, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
32. Id. at 360, 558 N.E.2d at 1028, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
33. Id. (citing Sol Wachtler, Stare Decisis and a Changing New York Court of Ap-
peals, 59 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 445 (1985) (Chief Judge Wachtler, a dissenter in Bartolomeo,
was a member of the Bing majority)).
34. Id. at 350, 558 N.E.2d at 1022, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
35. 75 N.Y.2d 517, 553 N.E.2d 1008, 554 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1990).
36. Id. at 522, 553 N.E.2d at 1012, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 464.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. It might well have been argued that the court's reasoning, while perhaps
relevant to permitting non-custodial waivers of the right to counsel, explains little about
[Vol. 12:1
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2. Right to Confront
In People v. Cintron,10 the Court of Appeals, relying largely
on the several concurring opinions at the Supreme Court in Coy
v. Iowa," upheld a state statute4 2 authorizing the use of live,
two-way, closed-circuit television to present the testimony of
child witnesses in sex crime cases, where the child might be
permitting custodial waivers - whether or not the initial requests for counsel were
non-custodial. The coercive power of the state, even if absent when a suspect requests
counsel, such as in a non-custodial setting, is certainly not absent when the suspect is
thereafter placed into custody and, in that setting, as in Davis, withdraws the request.
There were several other right to counsel decisions in 1990. In People v. Wicks, 76
N.Y.2d 128, 556 N.E.2d 409, 556 N.Y.S.2d 970 (1990), the court, in an unsigned per
curiam opinion, held that harmless error analysis is applicable to the failure to provide
counsel at a preliminary hearing that is intended only to determine whether a defendant
could be held for action by a grand jury. Id. at 130-31, 556 N.E.2d at 409-10, 556
N.Y.S.2d at 970-71. The court explained that the outcome of such a hearing does not
necessarily affect the fairness of the subsequent trial and that, in any event, if it did, the
error would not be harmless and would then require reversal. Id. at 133, 556 N.E.2d at
411, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 972. In dissent, Judge Titone, joined by Judge Kaye, argued that
harmless error analysis is inappropriate because of the impossibility of determining what
an attorney might have done if present at the preliminary hearing, especially since such
hearings provide a rare opportunity for discovery, cross-examining prosecution witnesses,
and subpoenaing other witnesses whom the prosecution has elected not to summon. Id.
at 137-38, 556 N.E.2d at 414, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
Additionally, in People v. Gonzales, 75 N.Y.2d 938, 554 N.E.2d 1269, 555 N.Y.S.2d
681, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 99 (1990), the court, in an unsigned memorandum, refused,
on the spontaneous utterance theory, to suppress the statements of a Spanish-speaking
defendant who, after asking the court-appointed interpreter at an arraignment whether
he could speak and after being told yes, proceeded to admit that he had killed the man
he was accused of murdering. Id. at 939-40, 554 N.E.2d at 1270, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 682. In
lone dissent, Judge Bellacosa argued that an accused who asks to speak in a judicial
setting should be warned against doing so in the absence of counsel as part of the court's
responsibility to safeguard the accused's rights. Id. at 941-42, 554 N.E.2d at 1271-72, 555
N.Y.S.2d at 683-84 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
Finally, in People v. LaClere, 76 N.Y.2d 670, 564 N.E.2d 640, 563 N.Y.S.2d 30
(1990), the single right to counsel case reviewed herein in which the defendant's claim of
violation was sustained, the unanimous Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge Bel-
lacosa, suppressed the evidence of a pre-accusatory, investigatory lineup conducted in
the absence of counsel; the police officers had disregarded counsel's notification, relayed
through a presiding judge on an unrelated matter, that counsel represented the defend-
ant and that no statements should be taken in his absence. Id. at 672-73, 564 N.E.2d at
641, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 31.
40. 75 N.Y.2d 249, 551 N.E.2d 561, 552 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1990).
41. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). See Cintron, 75 N.Y.2d at 257-59, 551 N.E.2d at 566-67,
552 N.Y.S.2d at 73-74.
42. See N.Y. CRIM. Paoc. LAW § 65.20 (McKinney & Supp. 1991).
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traumatized if required to testify inside the courtroom.43 Ini-
tially, the court, in an opinion by Judge Hancock, rejected the
claim that criminal defendants are absolutely entitled to face-to-
face confrontation with child witnesses." The "State's manifest
interest in protecting the child witness in child sexual abuse
prosecutions, ' 45 wrote Judge Hancock, justifies "some infringe-
ment of a defendant's confrontational rights" under the state, as
well as the federal, constitution. 6
In considering the constitutionality of the statute, the court
in Cintron was guided by two major considerations: (1) infringe-
ment of confrontational rights must be justified by individual-
ized necessity; and (2) the infringement must be kept to a mini-
mum.47 In the court's view, the statute met both criteria. 4'8 The
physical arrangements and technology prescribed by the statute
ensure that the televised testimony is as close to face-to-face
confrontation in the courtroom as is reasonably feasible. The tel-
evision must be two-way; the judge, jury and defendant must be
able to see and hear the child witness; the images of the jury and
the defendant must be transmitted simultaneously to the wit-
ness; the judge must be in full visual and auditory contact with
the witness; and cross examination must be possible to the same
extent as if the child were in the courtroom.49
With regard individualized necessity, the court acknowl-
edged that it was construing the statute to avoid possible consti-
tutional infirmity.50 Under the court's construction, before a mo-
tion to permit closed-circuit testimony may be
granted - whether that motion is made prior to or during
trial -- the trial judge must find by clear and convincing evi-
dence, and not merely by her own subjective observations, that
the child witness is "vulnerable. '51 Thus the judge must find
that the witness would likely suffer mental or emotional trauma
43. Cintron, 75 N.Y.2d at 256, 551 N.E.2d at 567, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
44. Id. at 259, 551 N.E.2d at 567, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 259-60, 551 N.E.2d at 567-68, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 74-75.
47. Id. at 258, 551 N.E.2d at 567, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
48. Id. at 261, 551 N.E.2d at 569, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 76.
49. Id. at 260-61, 551 N.E.2d at 568-69, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
50. Id. at 260, 551 N.E.2d at 567, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
51. Id. at 262-63, 551 N.E.2d at 569-70, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 76-77.
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if the motion is not granted, and that such trauma would be the
result of extraordinary circumstances.52 Additionally, the trial
judge must be satisfied that the defendant's rights to an impar-
tial jury and to confrontation would not be impaired.53
Despite the Court of Appeal's holding that the statute is
facially valid as construed, it nevertheless reversed the defend-
ant's conviction in Cintron on the ground that the trial judge
had based the determination of vulnerability solely on his sub-
jective impressions of the child witness."
In People v. Hults,55 the court held that a complaining wit-
ness's post-hypnotic statements, even though inconsistent with
her trial testimony, could not be used by the criminal defendant
for impeachment, because such statements are inherently unreli-
able. 6 The defendant in Hults had argued that such a limitation
impermissibly interfered with his constitutional right to cross
examine a prosecution witness.5 7 The majority, however, speak-
ing through Judge Alexander, upheld the trial judge's ruling to
preclude the use of the post-hypnotic statements. 8 The court
reasoned that "the scope of cross- examination is within the
sound discretion of the Trial Judge and like the exclusion of a
physically coerced statement, the exclusion of an inherently un-
reliable hypnotic statement may be within the Judge's
discretion." 59
Judge Hancock, joined by Judge Titone, dissented on the
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 265, 551 N.E.2d at 571, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 78. Judge Alexander, concurring
separately, opined that before closed-circuit television procedures could be used, there
must be an additional showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the jury's ability
to assess the demeanor and credibility of the child witness would not be, impaired. Id. at
267-68, 551 N.E.2d at 572-73, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 79-80. He also expressed "grave reserva-
tions" in light of present technological limitations - especially the inadequacies of
closed-circuit transmissions - whether the statute could in fact ever be constitutionally
applied. Id. at 272, 551 N.E.2d at 575, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
In lone dissent, Judge Bellacosa argued that the conviction should have been af-
firmed on the ground that the trial judge's observations provided legally sufficient sup-
port for his finding of vulnerability. Id. at 272-76, 551 N.E.2d at 575-78, 552 N.Y.S.2d at
82-85.
55. 76 N.Y.2d 190, 556 N.E.2d 1077, 557 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1990).
56. Id. at 192-93, 197-98, 556 N.E.2d at 1078, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
57. Id. at 196, 556 N.E.2d at 1080, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
58. Id. at 199, 556 N.E.2d at 1082, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 275.59. Id. (citations omitted).
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ground that the defendant's state and federal confrontation
rights had been unduly restricted.6 0 According to the dissenters,
there was no strong state interest, as required by both the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court, to justify the infringement.6 1
Judge Hancock elaborated that even if, as the majority claimed,
post-hypnotic recollections are inherently unreliable and unreli-
able statements are inadmissible as prior inconsistencies:
[That] hardly provides a compelling reason for denying a criminal
defendant the opportunity to confront a prosecution witness with
her hypnotic statement which not only conflicts with her trial
testimony, but also exculpates the defendant. At the least, some-
thing more than an evidentiary rule of general application is nec-
essary to limit the exercise of a basic trial right.6 2
60. Id. at.200, 556 N.E.2d at 1083, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 276 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
Judge Hancock also argued that, contrary to the majority's assertion, post-hypnotic
recollections are not necessarily unreliable, but simply not yet proven to be sufficiently
reliable to "be used by the prosecution as evidence to convict the defendant." Id. at 201,
556 N.E.2d at 1083, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 276. Judge Hancock added that even if post-hyp-
notic recollections are unreliable, that is irrelevant where a recollection is used solely for
impeachment as a prior inconsistent statement, because "[i]t is [then] not offered for its
truth; its reliability as an assertion of the truth is entirely beside the point." Id. at 202,
556 N.E.2d at 1084, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 277. With regard to the majority's analogy to invol-
untarily obtained confessions, Judge Hancock emphasized that such confessions were
precluded from impeachment and every other use, "not because of any lack of probative
value, but because of the core due process violation involved." Id. at 203, 556 N.E.2d at
1085, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 278.
61. 61. Id. at 204, 556 N.E.2d at 1085, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 278.
62. Id. In another confrontation rights case, Matter of Laureano v. Kuhlman, 75
N.Y.2d 141, 550 N.E.2d 437, 551 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1990), the unanimous court, in an opin-
ion by Chief Judge Wachtler, rejected a prison inmate's claim that prison authorities
"violated due process" [sic - federal or state?] when they denied his request in a disci-
plinary proceeding to call the confidential informant to testify. Id. at 147, 550 N.E.2d at
440, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 187. The record showed that the hearing officer feared reprisal
against the informant if he were exposed. Id. at 148, 550 N.E.2d at 441, 551 N.Y.S.2d at
188. According to the court, that was justification for denying the inmate's request, and
"the Constitution [sic - federal or state?] imposes no heavier burden." Id. It is not
clear whether the decision in Laureano had any independent state constitutional basis,
despite the citation to some New York precedents. References throughout the court's
opinion to "the Constitution" and reliance primarily on Supreme Court case law would
suggest - albeit not unequivocally - that the court rested its decision solely on fed-
eral law.
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3. Right to be Present
In People v. Cain,63 the court held that the defendant's
state and federal due process right to be present at all material
stages of trial was violated when the trial judge, in the defend-
ant's absence and prior to "accepting" the jury's guilty verdict,
discussed his jury instructions with a single juror who had indi-
cated reservations during a poll on the verdict.6" The judge had
invited the prosecutor and defense counsel to attend the post-
verdict conference; he ended the conference and announced his
"acceptance" of the verdict after the juror indicated that he was
no longer confused and was satisfied with his vote of guilty. 5
Speaking through Judge Titone, the Court of Appeals ruled
that, under these facts, where the actions of the judge made
clear that the trial was still ongoing during the pendency of the
post-verdict session, the defendant had a constitutional right to
be personally present - not merely through his attorney. 6 The
Cain majority concluded that, because prior case law established
that actual prejudice is irrelevant where this "absolute" right is
concerned,6" the trial judge's failure to honor it mandated a
reversal6 8
Two months later, however, in People v. Harris, the court
rejected a right-to-be-present claim on the ground that the com-
munication between the judge and the jury was purely ministe-
rial." In Harris, the deliberating jury had sent a note requesting
a read-back of some trial testimony concerning the complainant.
63. 76 N.Y.2d 119, 556 N.E.2d 141, 556 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1990).
64. Id. at 123-24, 556 N.E.2d at 143, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
65. Id. at 122-23, 556 N.E.2d at 142-143, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
66. Id. at 124, 556 N.E.2d at 143, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 850 (citing People v. Mehmedi, 69
N.Y.2d 759, 760, 505 N.E.2d 610, 611, 513 N.Y.S.2d 100, 101 (1986)).
67. Id. at 124, 556 N.E.2d at 143, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
68. Id. at 124, 556 N.E.2d at 144, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 851. Judge Simons, dissenting in
part, concurred with the majority on the state constitutional right to be present "because
defendant was absent during a material part of the trial." Id. at 125, 556 N.E.2d at 144,
556 N.Y.S.2d at 851. Judge Bellacosa, however, disagreed on that issue, arguing that the
post-verdict session "had absolutely nothing to do with the integrity of the verdict." Id.
at 127, 556 N.E.2d at 145, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 852. He also argued that the "unwarranted"
result reached by the majority "proves the danger of developing per se procedural rules
which are then applied and extended unreasonably and preciously." Id. at 127, 556
N.E.2d at 145, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
69. 76 N.Y.2d 810, 559 N.E.2d 660, 559 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1990).
70. Id. at 812, 559 N.E.2d at 662, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
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The judge, accompanied by the prosecutor and defense counsel,
went to the door of the jury room and asked whether the request
was for the victim's testimony." In an unsigned memorandum,
the majority held that the defendant's presence during that
communication bore no relation to defending the charges and,
therefore, defendant's presence was not constitutionally re-
quired.72 This "ministerial communication," the court reasoned,
"was wholly unrelated to the substantive legal or factual issues
of the trial. '73
Taking issue with the majority, Judge Titone, joined by
Judge Kaye in dissent, found the court's reasoning, "to say the
least, puzzling, since the colloquy directly concerned which por-
tion of the trial testimony would be reread - clearly a matter
of substance."' 7' Noting that the court had recently held that a
one-sentence directive to the jury to continue deliberating could
not be characterized as merely "ministerial,"7 5 Judge Titone ar-
gued that, a fortiori, neither could the task of clarifying a jury's
request for testimony.7 e Such a task demands "specialized judi-
cial discretion" in framing the clarifying questions, avoiding po-
tentially prejudicial remarks, and ultimately deciding what ex-
actly the jurors want.77
Moreover, added Judge Titone, a personally present defend-
ant who has himself heard the testimony at trial and observed
the jurors' reactions might well have insights about the jury's
inquiry, the clarifying questions, or the appropriate response to
the jury's request.7 Because the "fullness -of [the defendant's]
opportunity to defend is [thus] unquestionably implicated when
the defendant is excluded from a 'clarifying colloquy' such as
this one, ' 79 Judge Titone concluded, the state and federal due
process requirements of the right to be present at trial were not
71. Id. at 811, 559 N.E.2d at 661, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
72. Id. at 812, 559 N.E.2d at 662, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 813, 559 N.E.2d at 662, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 968 (Titone, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 813, 559 N.E.2d at 662, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 969 (citing People v. Torres, 72
N.Y.2d 1007, 1009, 531 N.E.2d 635, 636, 534 N.Y.S.2d 914, 915 (1988)).
76. Id. at 814, 559 N.E.2d at 663, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 969.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 815, 559 N.E.2d at 663, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 969 (quoting Snyder v. Mass., 291
U.S. 97, 105-106 (1934)).
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satisfied.80
B. Criminal Justice: Procedural Safeguards
1. Investigation
In People v. Dunn,"1 the Court of Appeals ruled that, as a
matter of state law, police use of specially trained narcotics de-
tection dogs in the common hallways of an apartment building,
for the purpose of determining whether illegal contraband is
present inside private residences, must be justified by reasonable
suspicion. 2 Concluding that such hallway "canine sniffs" do not
constitute searches under federal case law and, therefore, are not
subject to Fourth Amendment restrictions,"3 the court turned to
the New York Constitution. Judge Titone, writing for the major-
ity, noted that the Court of Appeals "has not hesitated to inter-
pret article I, § 12 independently of its Federal counterpart"'
when Supreme Court decisions have "threatened to undercut
the right of our citizens to be free from unreasonable govern-
ment intrusions.""5 Because, in the Court of Appeals' view, ap-
plicable Supreme Court precedent "does just that", New York
would take a different course.8"
Rejecting the Supreme Court's analysis in United States v.
Place,s7 Judge Titone opined that the fact that an investigative
80. Id. at 816, 559 N.E.2d at 664, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 970. In another right-to-be-pre-
sent decision, People v. Brooks, 75 N.Y.2d 898, 553 N.E.2d 1328, 554 N.Y.S.2d 818
(1990), the court, in a brief unsigned memorandum, unanimously held that it was revers-
ible error for the trial judge to proceed with summations and charge to the jury in de-
fendant's absence, only thirty-seven minutes after trial was scheduled to recommence,
where the record revealed no inquiry into defendant's absence nor any facts or reasons
relied upon by the judge to support a determination that defendant's absence was delib-
erate, and therefore, that the defendant had forfeited his right to be present. Id. at 899,
553 N.E.2d at 1329, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
81. 77 N.Y.2d 19, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1990).
82. Id. at 26, 564 N.E.2d at 1058, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
83. Id. at 23, 564 N.E.2d at 1056, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
84. Id. at 24, 564 N.E.2d at 1057, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 391. Article I, § 12 of the New
York State Constitution is the identical counterpart of the federal Fourth Amendment.
85. Id. at 24, 564 N.E.2d at 1057, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
86. Id. at 23, 564 N.E.2d at 1056, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 390 (citing U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S.
696 (1983) [an airport canine sniff held not subject to Fourth Amendment restrictions]
and United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) [government conduct revealing con-
traband but no other private facts does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search]).
87. Id. See also 462 U.S. at 707.
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procedure, such as the "canine sniff", only discloses evidence of
criminality is not significant in determining whether the proce-
dure constitutes a search.88 Though the procedure may be rela-
tively "discriminate and nonintrusive," Judge Titone reasoned,
nevertheless "it remains a way of detecting the contents of a pri-
vate place." 89 The proper focus of analysis, he asserted for the
majority, is not what the government investigative technique
might uncover, but whether the technique intrudes into an area
of reasonably expected privacy.90 Thus focused, the analysis
makes "clear that the use of the trained canine outside defend-
ant's apartment constituted a search," because it revealed "in-
formation regarding the contents of a place that has tradition-
ally been accorded a heightened expectation of privacy."9
The court's conclusion in Dunn was supported, not only by
the "more appropriate" '92 analysis, but also by fundamental pol-
icy considerations which the court derived from state constitu-
tional notions of protected privacy.9 3 Judge Titone explained:
To hold otherwise, we believe would raise the specter of the police
roaming indiscriminately through the corridors of public housing
projects with trained dogs in search of drugs. Such an Orwellian
notion would be repugnant under our State Constitution. "[T]he
State Constitution protects the privacy interests of the people of
our State ... against the unfettered discretion of government of-
ficials to search or seize."94
Having thus explained why a "canine sniff" was to be
treated as a "search" under state law, the court nonetheless held
that neither a warrant nor probable cause was required.9 5 Inas-
much as a canine sniff is less intrusive than a full-blown
search - i.e., "[i]t does not entail entry into the premises or
88. Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d at 24, 564 N.E.2d 1057, 563 N.Y.S.2d 391.
89. Id. at 24-25, 564 N.E.2d at 1057, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 391 (citing Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
at 140-141 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
90. Id. at 25, 564 N.E.2d at 1058, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 25-26, 564 N.E.2d at 1058, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 392 (quoting People v. Belton,
55 N.Y.2d 49, 52, 447 N.Y.S.2d 873, 874, 432 N.E.2d 745, 746 (1982) (Cooke, C. J.) (em-
phasis in Dunn) (citations omitted)).
95. Id. at 26, 564 N.E.2d at 1058, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
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exposure of one's personal effects" 96 - the court concluded
that a lesser justification was required and held that reasonable
suspicion was sufficient.9 7 The court in Dunn also concluded
that, under the facts presented, the police did have reasonable
suspicion that defendant's apartment contained illegal drugs,
and thus, the canine sniff in the common hallway did not violate
the state constitution.9 8
In another Court of Appeals decision, People v. Centano,99
the court rejected the defendant's claim that his interrogation
was custodial and, therefore, that his non-Mirandized state-
ments should have been suppressed.'00 Applying the general rule
that the Court of Appeals can overturn a trial court's factual
findings, left undisturbed by the Appellate Division, only if the
supporting proof is insufficient as a matter of law,' 0 ' the major-
ity held that the evidence in the record sufficed to permit the
finding below that the interrogation was non-custodial. 10 2
The majority's unsigned, two-paragraph memorandum
evoked a vehement dissent from Judge Titone who was joined
by Judges Alexander and Hancock. "[W]e are still bound to ex-
amine the conclusions of the lower courts from a realistic view-
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 26-27, 564 N.E.2d at 1059, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
Judges Simons and Bellacosa concurred in result only, in a one line addition to the
court's remittitur, "stress[ing] that in their view the sniff by a trained police dog in the
hallway outside defendant's apartment did not constitute a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or New York Constitution,
article I, § 12." Id. at 27, 564 N.E.2d at 1059, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
In People v. Natal, 75 N.Y.2d 379, 553 N.E.2d 239, 553 N.Y.S.2d 650 (1990), cert.
denied 111 S. Ct. 169 (1990), another state constitutional search and seizure case, a
unanimous court, in an opinion by Judge Kaye, upheld the validity of a warrantless in-
spection of the defendant's clothing and personal effects which had previously been in-
ventoried and searched in the course of a concededly lawful routine procedure at the
time of his arrest and placement into pre-trial confinement. Because the disputed items
were "already fully exposed to view and identified, in accordance with law," their subse-
quent transfer to the district attorney, solely for his use as evidence at trial, did not, in
the court's view, constitute an intrusion into any remaining expectation of privacy the
defendant could reasonably and legitimately have entertained. Id. at 384, 553 N.E.2d at
241, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
99. 76 N.Y.2d 837, 559 N.E.2d at 1280, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 121 (1990).
100. Id. at 838, 559 N.E.2d at 1281, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 122.
101. Id. (citing People v. Williamson, 51 N.Y.2d 801, 802 (1980) (findings must be
based on the proper legal standard and supported by evidence in the record)).
102. Id.
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point," Judge Titone chided, "and to overturn those conclusions
when they rest on inferences that go beyond the borders of ordi-
nary common sense."1 03 Such, the dissenters argued, was the
case here. The defendant was at the stationhouse for twenty-
eight hours; he was at all times in the presence of a police of-
ficer, even in the bathroom;' 4 after he "failed" the first poly-
graph test, he said that he no longer wished to cooperate; he was
neither advised that he could leave nor advised that he could
end the questioning; instead, he was "asked" to remain to take
another polygraph test and to stay overnight; the defendant
complied and, the next day, he was advised that he had "failed"
the second polygraph. 05 Only then did the defendant begin to
confess. 06 By that time, the dissenters insisted, "[n]o sensible
person [in defendant's] shoes could have rationally believed that
he could simply have thanked the police for their trouble and
walked away." ''
In closing, Judge Titone explained his primary motivation
for writing a full-blown dissent in an essentially fact-based
case. 10 "My underlying concern," he said, "is for the degree to
which the 'mixed question' doctrine'09 may have impaired our
ability as a court of last resort to supervise the lower courts' en-
forcement of well-settled constitutional principles."" 0 The dis-
senters stressed that, while the mixed-question rule serves the
salutary purpose of judicial economy,"' it ought not to insulate
from the court's review factual holdings, such as those in
Centano, that defy "common sense and experience.""' The
court should reject such "findings," urged an adamant Judge
Titone, and thereby demonstrate its "commitment to the en-
103. Id. at 841, 559 N.E.2d at 1283, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 124.
104. Id. at 839, 559 N.E.2d at 1282, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 123.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 840, 559 N.E.2d at 1282, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 123.
108. Id.
109. Id. See also People v. Harrison, 57 N.Y.2d 470, 477-78, 443 N.E.2d 447, 451,
457 N.Y.S.2d 199, 203 (1982) (on issues such as reasonable suspicion, probable cause, and
custody, in which fact and law are closely intertwined, the determinations of the lower
courts, as on pure factual questions, will be upheld as long as they are supported by
some evidence in the record).
110. Centano, 76 N.Y.2d at 840, 559 N.E.2d at 1282, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 123.
111. Id. at 841-42, 559 N.E.2d at 1282-83, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 124.
112. Id.
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forcement of the constitutional rights it posits. '113
In People v. Sirno, " the court again affirmed "undisturbed
findings" below," 5 again in an unsigned memorandum - this
time in one paragraph - over another forceful dissent by Judge
Titone. In Sirno, the court held that the Spanish speaking de-
fendant implicitly waived his Miranda rights by, first, writing
"yes" next to each statement on a card, which described his
rights in his language, and second, by proceeding to give the po-
lice a statement.11 6 Noting that New York case law permits
waivers of Miranda rights to be inferred,1 7 the majority asserted
that "it is difficult to imagine that [the defendant's] . . . cooper-
ation could be interpreted as anything other than [his] intention
to waive those rights."1 8
But in Judge Titone's view, this time alone in dissent,
"there is simply no circumstance in this case - apart from the
bare fact of defendant's statement itself - from which a waiver
of rights could be inferred." 1 9 Hence, according to Judge
Titone, the majority could not legitimately "resort to the talis-
manic 'mixed question' doctrine," which applies only when the
findings below are supported by the record.120 The Spanish form
given the defendant did not ask whether he understood the
rights described. 21 Thus, his writing "yes" or "no" in English
next to each statement, as he was told to do by the police, "can-
not be construed as an affirmative acknowledgement of his un-
derstanding that the law would protect him if he chose not to
speak." '22 Nor, in Judge Titone's view, could a waiver validly be
inferred from the defendant's failure to ask any ques-
tions - conduct amounting to nothing more than silence which
113. Id. at 841, 559 N.E.2d at 1283, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 124.
114. 76 N.Y.2d 967, 565 N.E.2d 479, 563 N.Y.S.2d 730 (1990).
115. Id. at 968, 565 N.E.2d at 480, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 731 (1990).
116. Id.
117. Id. (citing People v. Davis, 55 N.Y.2d 731, 431 N.E.2d 634, 447 N.Y.S.2d 149
(1981) (defendant's arrest on eleven prior occasions permitted the inference that he un-
derstood his conduct to constitute a Miranda waiver)).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 970, 565 N.E.2d at 481, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 732.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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has no permissible evidentiary value. 12  Finally, complained
Judge Titone, the majority's proposition - that a defendant's
cooperation is the clearest manifestation of an implied
waiver 124 - "inverts the well-established burden of proof" on
the prosecution, and effectively requires defendants to disprove
the inference of waiver, now permitted, whenever they speak af-
ter Miranda warnings are given. 12 5
2. Grand Jury and Trial
In People v. Menchetti,28 the court held that waiver of the
right to grand jury indictment, by pleading to an information
filed by the district attorney, is authorized by the state constitu-
tion,'12 7 even if the information only charges a lesser included of-
fense of the crime charged in the felony complaint. 2 ' The de-
fendant argued that the information to which he had pleaded
was defective because it did not charge the same offense as that
in the felony complaint. 29 Acknowledging that the state consti-
tutional requirement of prosecution by indictment "implicates
the personal rights of the defendant as well as a fundamental
123. Id. at 968, 970, 565 N.E.2d at 480, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 732 (citing Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (no inference of waiver permitted "simply from the silence
of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in
fact eventually obtained.")).
124. Id. at 968, 565 N.E.2d at 481-82, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 733.
125. Id. at 971, 565 N.E.2d at 482, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 733. In People v. Basora, 75
N.Y.2d 992, 556 N.E.2d 1070, 557 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1990), another case dealing with impli-
cations and inferences, the court held that no legitimate inference could be drawn from
the defendant's smiling when he was arrested. Relying in part on the federal Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent, the court ruled that, as an evidentiary matter, a de-
fendant's smile is too ambiguous to have any communicative value. Id. at 993-994, 556
N.E.2d at 1070, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
126. 76 N.Y.2d 473, 561 N.E.2d at 536, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 760 (1990).
127. Id. at 476, 561 N.E.2d at 537, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 761. See also Article I, Section
VI which provides, in pertinent part:
a person held for the action of grand jury upon a charge for an [infamous]
offense, other than one punishable by death or life imprisonment, with the con-
sent of the district attorney, may waive indictment by a grand jury and consent to
be prosecuted on information filed by the district attorney; such waiver shall be
evidenced by written instrument signed by the defendant in open court in the
presence of his counsel.
N.Y. CONST. Art. I, §VI.
128. Menchetti, 76 N.Y.2d at 474, 561 N.E.2d at 537, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 761.
129. Id. at 475, 561 N.E.2d at 537, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 761.
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public right,"' 1 0 and that the constitution provides only a single
exception to that requirement,"' the court nevertheless noted
that "nothing in article I, § VI [of the New York Constitution]
mandates that the superior court information charge each and
every offense in the felony complaint.""1 2
Instead, explained Judge Alexander in a unanimous deci-
sion, the constitutional provision permits the waiver of indict-
ment "upon a charge" as long as the defendant consents to pros-
ecution "on an information. '" 133 Moreover, the court reasoned,
the provision contemplates that the offense charged in the infor-
mation will not necessarily mirror that in the complaint; it "re-
quires that the [defendant's] written waiver expressly state the
charges to be included in the information.""'3 Hence, the court
concluded, the information need only charge some offense for
which the defendant was being held for grand jury action, which,
under the Criminal Procedure Law,135 includes lesser included
offenses as well as the greater one explicitly charged in the fel-
ony complaint. 3 6
130. Id. at 476, 561 N.E.2d at 538, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 477, 561 N.E.2d at 538, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
133. Id. (emphasis in original).
134. Id.
135. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW §§ 195.65, 210.20 [11[b], 210.30 [1].
136. Menchetti, 76 N.Y.2d at 475, 561 N.E.2d at 537, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 761. The
Court of Appeals decided two other interesting cases on indictment waivers in 1990;
both, however, under the statutory scheme found in N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 195.10. In
People v. Boston, 75 N.Y.2d 585, 554 N.E.2d 64, 555 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1990), the unanimous
court, speaking through Judge Kaye, nullified the defendant's plea to an information on
the ground that the purported waiver of indictment violated the unequivocal language of
section 195.10 that the waiver be exercised "prior to the filing of an indictment by the
Grand Jury." Id. at 586-87, 554 N.E.2d at 65, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
But five months later, in an unsigned memorandum in People v. D'Amico, 76 N.Y.2d
877, 562 N.E.2d 488, 561 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1990), a divided court upheld the defendant's
plea to an information, even though he had already been indicted, on the ground that a
new felony complaint had been filed after the original indictment. The majority ex-
plained that Boston did not decide whether the waiver procedure is available when, al-
beit after indictment, the defendant is held again for grand jury action on the basis of a
new felony complaint. According to the majority, because there was a new order holding
the defendant in this case, the predicate for a waiver existed anew. Id. at 880, 562 N.E.2d
at 490, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
Not surprisingly, Judge Kaye, in a dissent joined by Judges Alexander and Hancock,
took issue. "We are again asked the same question [as in Boston] but, remarkably, give
the opposite answer." Id. at 881, 562 N.E.2d at 490, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 413. (Kaye, J.,
dissenting). As for the critical distinction between this case and Boston relied upon by
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In People v. Scalza 37 and People v. Carter,3 " the Court of
Appeals rejected due process claims that were based, respec-
tively, upon a non-judge's presiding over a pre-trial suppression
hearing3 9 and a non-lawyer's prosecution of the government's
case at the grand jury and at trial. 40 In Scalza, the defendant
was convicted in county court after his suppression motions
were heard and denied by a "judicial hearing officer" [hereinaf-
ter JHO]. Under Criminal Procedure Law § 255.20(4), the judge
presiding over a criminal case may refer any pre-trial motion to
a hearing officer who, although not authorized to render the final
decision, does make factual and legal conclusions for use by the
court.'" The defendant in Scalza argued that the referral of any
part of the judicial function to a non-judge violated the state
constitutional provision establishing the county courts, as well as
state constitutional due process. 42
The majority, in an opinion by Judge Bellacosa, noted that
the state constitutional provisions governing the county courts
"contain no such express or implied prohibitory language" pre-
cluding referrals to JHOs.'4 3 Moreover, the majority continued,
the majority - i.e., that the defendant was being held for grand jury action on a new
felony complaint - Judge Kaye's response was sharp: "No such order was issued ...
[The new] felony complaint was filed merely to facilitate the plea bargain, not to hold
this defendant." Id. at 882, 562 N.E.2d at 491, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 414. The majority's
"aboutface," Judge Kaye warned, "cannot engender respect for this court's holdings"
and, moreover, means that prosecutors can now obtain a waiver in any case "[b]y the
simple expedient of filing a felony complaint." Id.
137. 76 N.Y.2d 604, 563 N.E.2d 705, 562 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1990).
138. 77 N.Y.2d 95, 566 N.E.2d 119, 564 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1990).
139. Scalza, 76 N.Y.2d at 606, 563 N.E.2d at 706, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
140. Id. at 606, 563 N.E.2d at 705-06, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 14-15.
141. Section 255.20(4) of the New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules provides in
pertinent part:
Any pre-trial motions. .. may be referred by the court to a judicial hearing officer
who shall entertain it in the same manner as a court. In the discharge of this
responsibility, the judicial officer shall have the same powers as a judge of the
court making the assignment, except that the judicial officer shall not determine
the motion but shall file a report with the court setting forth findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
N.Y. CraM. PROC. LAW 255.20(4) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1990).
142. Scalza, 76 N.Y.2d at 607, 563 N.E.2d at 706, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 15. The New
York State Constitution sets forth the terms and conditions of county court judges and
establishes the jurisdiction of these courts over all crimes and other violations of the law.
N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 10, 11.
143. Id. at 609, 563 N.E.2d at 707, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
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"[t]he Trial Judge always keeps the plenary power to reject, ac-
cept or modify the JHO's report""4 under the statute, "and
holds the tether on the case throughout the completion of the
referral. 1" 5 As for the due process claim under the state consti-
tution, it was "readily answered,"'1" wrote Judge Bellacosa, who
then applied a United States Supreme Court ,7 precedent re-
jecting a federal due process claim against a similar referral pro-
cedure. The majority agreed with the Supreme Court that the
"protections at a suppression hearing 'may be less demanding
and elaborate than the protections accorded the defendant at
the trial itself.' "148
Judge Titone dissented alone. A "judge who merely 'holds
the tether' and does not personally preside at a suppression
hearing," argued Judge Titone, "cannot realistically be expected
accurately to perform [the essential] task" of weighing and ap-
praising testimony. 149 Because the referral procedure transfers
"a critical aspect of the judicial decision-making process to non-
judicial officers," it effects, according to Judge Titone, an imper-
missible delegation of the authority that trial court judges
should be exercising themselves.150
Additionally, Judge Titone took issue with the majority's re-
liance on federal law to resolve the state due process issue.
While agreeing that state, as well-as federal, due process requires
a balancing of interests,151 Judge Titone thought an independent
analysis more appropriate:
[The] Supreme Court majority's decision in United States v.
Raddatz is all but dispositive of any claims appellant might make
under the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. How-
ever we remain free to chart a separate course under our own
State constitutional due process provisions. Although the major-
144. Id. at 608, 563 N.E.2d at 707, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
145. Id. at 609, 563 N.E.2d at 707, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
146. Id.
147. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980) (upholding the Federal Mag-
istrates Act authorizing district court judges to refer suppression motions to magistrates
who conduct hearings and make recommendations).
148. Scalza, 76 N.Y.2d at 609, 563 N.E.2d at 707-08, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 16-17 (quoting
Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 679).
149. Id. at 612, 563 N.E.2d at 709, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
150. Id. at 613, 563 N.E.2d at 709, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
151. Id. at 614, 563 N.E.2d at 711, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 20.
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ity has apparently chosen to follow the Raddatz analysis in
resolving appellant's State constitutional claim, I would opt for a
different approach in light of our long-standing recognition of the
central importance of suppression hearings in many criminal
proceedings.15 2
Disagreeing with the majority that diminished protection is
justified at suppression hearings because guilt or innocence is
not at issue, Judge Titone rejoined that "the outcomes of sup-
pression hearings implicate the basic liberty interests of the ac-
cused."'1 53 As a practical matter, wrote Judge Titone recalling
Court of Appeals precedent,""' "the determination of the motion
to suppress often determines the ultimate question of guilt.' 1
55
In People v. Carter,6 6 the court refused to vacate convic-
tions obtained by an assistant district attorney who was not a
licensed lawyer. The defendants had argued, among other
things, that their prosecution by a non-lawyer violated federal
and state due process. 57 The court, speaking through Judge
Hancock, noted that it was unaware of any authority supporting
the claimed fundamental right of a defendant to be prosecuted
152. Id. at 614, 563 N.E.2d at 710-11, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 19-20 (citations omitted).
153. Id. at 615, 563 N.E.2d at 711, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 20.
154. See People v. Anderson, 16 N.Y.2d 282, 213 N.E.2d 445, 266 N.Y.S.2d 110
(1965) (accused has right to be present at suppression hearings no less than at trial).
155. Scalza, 76 N.Y.2d at 615, 563 N.E.2d at 711, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 20 (quoting An-
derson, 16 N.Y.2d.at 288, 213 N.E.2d at 448, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 114). Judge Titone also
expressed his concern with the trend of replacing constitutional judges with JHOs as a
way to alleviate overcrowded dockets:
While the chronic logjams in our courts, the threat of inundation and breakdown
in some of the most critical parts of the justice system and the insistent public
pressure to "process" cases more swiftly make [heavy reliance on non-judicial per-
sonnel] a tempting option, I am hesitant to embrace it too readily, lest "principles
that were meant to endure be sacrificed to expediency."
Id. at 616-17, 563 N.E.2d at 712, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 21 (quoting United States v. Raddatz,
447 U.S. 667, 714 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
Finally, the majority chose not to address the concerns thoughtfully expressed in
Judge Titone's dissent. Instead, Judge Bellacosa's majority opinion concluded with this
final line: "The views expressed in the dissenting opinion do not warrant direct response
other than the analysis and authorities already supplied by the opinion of the Court to
decide this case." Id. at 611, 563 N.E.2d at 708, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 17. But, of course, the
majority's reliance on federal authority to answer a state issue emphatically did not an-
swer Judge Titone's query as to why the majority did, in fact, rely on federal rather than
state precedent.
156. 77 N.Y.2d 95, 566 N.E.2d 119, 564 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1990).
157. Id. at 106, 566 N.E.2d at 123, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
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by a duly admitted attorney.158 Consequently, in the absence of
some showing that the defendants were actually prejudiced, the
court held that the fact that the prosecutor was not a lawyer did
not, without more, result in any deprivation of due process.1"9
In another dissent, Judge Titone, this time joined by Judge
Alexander, argued that prosecution by a non-lawyer, rather than
being a mere technical defect, operates to impair the very integ-
rity of the grand jury process.1a0 "[T]here can be no assurance,"
reasoned Judge Titone, that a legal impostor "exercised the con-
siderable discretion that the law confers upon the District Attor-
ney in a manner consistent with the controlling legal principles,
the ethical precepts that constrain licensed attorneys and the
sound judgment that licensed attorneys are presumed to
possess." ''
Warning that the grand jury process is demeaned when in-
dictments obtained by an unlicensed, fraudulent prosecutor are
158. Id.
159. Id. at 107, 566 N.E.2d at 124, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
160. Id. at 110, 566 N.E.2d at 126, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 999. Titone quoted the court's
former observations in People v. DiFalco, 44 N.Y.2d 482, 377 N.E.2d 732, 406 N.Y.S.2d
279 (1987):
During the actual [Grand Jury] proceedings, the legal advisor of the Grand Jury is
the District Attorney [represented by an appointed Assistant] .... The District
Attorney [through an appointed Assistant] determines the competency of wit-
nesses to testify .. . and must instruct the jury on the legal significance of the
evidence .... He, in effect, determines what witnesses to present .. .and who
should be excluded. These duties and powers . . . vest th[e District Attorney and
the appointed Assistants] with substantial control over the Grand Jury proceed-
ings, requiring the exercise of completely impartial judgment and discretion.
Carter, 77 N.Y.2d at 110-11, 566 N.E.2d at 126, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 999 (quoting Di Falco,
44 N.Y.2d at 486-87, 377 N.E.2d at 735, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 282.)
161. Carter, 77 N.Y.2d at 111, 566 N.E.2d at 127, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 1000 (citations
omitted). Indeed, although the facts in DiFalco were certainly distinguishable - there,
the indictments were dismissed because the special prosecutor lacked subject matter ju-
risdiction - the reasoning of the unanimous court in that case, in an unsigned per
curiam opinion, was identical to that proffered here by Judge Titone. The DiFalco court
said:
The basic issue on this appeal is whether the presence of an unauthorized prose-
cutor before a Grand Jury is sufficiently likely to result in prejudice to the defend-
ant that dismissal of the indictment is appropriate. We find that the crucial na-
ture of the prosecutor's role vis & vis the Grand Jury, particularly in view of his
discretionary authority, mandates a finding that prejudice to the defendant is
likely to result from the presence of an unauthorized prosecutor before the Grand
Jury.
44 N.Y.2d at 485, 377 N.E.2d at 734, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 281.
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not dismissed as fatally tainted, Judge Titone explained:
Given the central importance of the prosecutor's role in the
Grand Jury system, I do not believe that we can, or should, ac-
cept as a proper predicate for a criminal prosecution the work
product of a Grand Jury whose "legal adviser" was a person ...
who was never certified as competent by the State Board of Law
Examiners, was never approved by the Committee on Character
and Fitness and who himself had such little personal regard for
the law that he was willing to perpetuate a 16-year fraud on both
his employers and the public."s2
In People v. Vilardi,"'6 the Court of Appeals, rejecting Su-
preme Court case law, 64 adopted a rule more protective of crim-
inal defendants. The New York court held that prosecutorial
failure to disclose exculpatory evidence specifically sought by a
defendant requires reversal and a new trial, whenever there is a
reasonable possibility - not probability - that the non-dis-
closure contributed to the conviction. 65
The Supreme Court, in Brady v. Maryland,66 established
the federal constitutional requirement that the prosecution dis-
close to the defendant all evidence in its possession that is both
material and favorable to the defendant.167 Subsequently, in
United States v. Agurs,' 5s the Supreme Court created two sepa-
rate tests to determine whether the failure to disclose required
reversal of a conviction.' In the case of specifically requested
evidence, non-disclosure was held to require reversal whenever it
"might have affected" the trial outcome. 70 On the other hand,
non-disclosure in the face of a mere general request was held to
require reversal only if the evidentiary material, in fact, "cre-
ate[d] a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist." '' Later,
162. Carter, 77 N.Y.2d at 112, 566 N.E.2d at 127-28, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 1000-01.
163. 76 N.Y.2d 67, 555 N.E.2d 915, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1990).
164. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 684 (1985) (prosecutorial failure to
disclose specifically requested exculpatory evidentiary material requires a new trial only
if it were "reasonably probable" that the trial outcome would have been different).
165. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 71, 555 N.E.2d at 917, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
166. 373 U.S. 83 (1961).
167. Id. at 86-87.
168. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
169. Id. at 103-04.
170. Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 112.
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in United States v. Bagley,7 a divided Supreme Court replaced
the two-tiered approach with a single test, requiring reversal for
non-disclosure only where the defendant demonstrates a "rea-
sonable probability" that the outcome of the trial would have
been different. 71
The Court of Appeals in Vilardi declined to adopt the sin-
gle-test approach.1 7 4 Instead, the court retained the "reasonable
possibility"-of-prejudice test for application whenever the non-
disclosed material was specifically requested.1 75  Speaking
through Judge Kaye, the court majority explained:
[This] "reasonable possibility" standard . . . essentially a refor-
mulation of the "seldom if ever excusable" rule - is a clear rule
that properly encourages compliance with these [Brady] obliga-
tions, and we therefore conclude that as a matter of State consti-
tutional law it is preferable to Bagley. Moreover, the . . . "reason-
able probability" standard - which we have chosen not to adopt
as a matter of State law despite several invitations to do
so - remits the impact of the exculpatory evidence to appellate
hindsight, thus significantly diminishing the vital interest this
court has long recognized in a decision rendered by a jury whose
ability to render that decision is unimpaired by failure to disclose
important evidence. 17
In a concurring opinion in which he elaborated his views on
state constitutional differences with corresponding Supreme
Court case law,1 7 Judge Simons argued that the Court of Ap-
peals "should not disregard the Supreme Court's decisions
merely because it disagrees with them or dislikes- the result
reached.' 17 18 Judge Simons, who was joined by Chief Judge
Wachtler and Judge Bellacosa, asserted that in this area of the
law, New York has no rules independent of federal prece-
dents.17 1 Moreover, the Bagley rule "strikes a fair and proper
172. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
173. Id. at 682 (emphasis added).
174. People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 77, 555 N.E.2d 915, 920, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518, 523
(1990).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 77-78, 555 N.E.2d at 920, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 523 (citations omitted).
177. See id. at 80-81, 83-84, 555 N.E.2d 915, 922, 924, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518, 525, 527
(Simons, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 80, 555 N.E.2d at 922, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 525.
179. Id. at 85, 555 N.E.2d at 925, 556 NY.S.2d at 528.
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balance between prosecution and defense and offers the advan-
tages of uniformity and consistency with the Federal standards
in criminal proceedings . ."80 Hence, finding "no reason to
construe our State Constitution's Due Process Clause in a way
different from the Due Process Clauses in the Federal Constitu-
tion," Judge Simons concluded that he would apply the federal
"reasonable probability"-of-prejudice standard to determine
whether a non-disclosure of Brady material - generally or spe-
cifically requested - justifies reversal. 181
3. Sentencing and Appeal
In People v. Van Pelt,82 the court held that the severity of
a sentence may not be increased upon retrial, even if by a differ-
ent judge than presided at the first trial, unless justified by some
new intervening fact.183 Under Supreme Court precedent,18 4 a
harsher retrial sentence is presumptively vindictive and must be
rebutted by "identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant
occurring after the time of the original sentencing .... "185 When
the sentencer on retrial is different, however, a rebuttal is not
required because the new sentence is not deemed an "increase,"
but a different sentence altogether.8 6
In a unanimous opinion by Judge Bellacosa, the Court of
Appeals in Van Pelt adopted a different rule. The court held
that New York State Due Process "requires the application of
the presumption" of "institutional" vindictiveness "as a proce-
dural safeguard against punitively toughened sentences. '1 7 That
a different judge imposed the second sentence is not dispositive.
Under the state constitution it is but one factor to be weighed
along with other justifications articulated on the record. '88
180. Id. at 86, 555 N.E.2d at 926, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 529.
181. Id. at 78-79, 555 N.E.2d at 921, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 524. Judge Simons concurred
in result apparently on the ground that a reasonable probability of prejudice had been
demonstrated. Id. (emphasis in original).
182. 76 N.Y.2d 156, 556 N.E.2d 423, 556 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1990).
183. Id. at 156, 556 N.E.2d at 423, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 984.
184. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
185. Id. at 726.
186. Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 140 (1986).
187. Van Pelt, 76 N.Y.2d at 161, 556 N.E.2d at 425, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 986 (emphasis
added).
188. Id.
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The only arguable justification alluded to by the retrial
judge was that defendant had forced the complainant to "'come
in twice and relive the trauma'" of the violent crime.1 89 But
that, the Court of Appeals explained, was the result of errors in
the first trial and of defendant's successful appeal; 0o the former
surely can not be blamed on the defendant,1 91 and the latter is
the exercise of an important New York right.9 2 Absent any
qualifying justification on the record, the court held in Van Pelt
that the imposition of a harsher sentence violated state due pro-
cess requirements, and therefore the defendant was entitled to
resentencing.19 3
C. Civil Liberties and Equality
1. Expression, Autonomy and Privacy
In Golden v. Clark,94 the court upheld a New York City
Charter provision'98 prohibiting a wide range of high city offi-
cials from holding any one of several significant party posi-
tions - e.g., county leader, officer of the county committee, or
national or state committee member. The charter provision was
challenged as violative of various state constitutional guarantees
of free expression, association and equal treatment. 9 ' The court,
189. Id. at 162, 556 N.E.2d at 426, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 162-63, 556 N.E.2d at 425-26, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 987-88.
193. Id. at 158, 556 N.E.2d at 424, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 984-85. In People v. Moissett, 76
N.Y.2d 909, 564 N.E.2d 653, 563 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1990), another case involving the right to
appeal, the court held that the record supported the conclusion that the defendant
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right, albeit not explicitly so at the
plea allocution. Counsel had advised the trial judge that the defendant was waiving any
right to appeal and the defendant himself assured the judge that he understood counsel's
statements and had no questions before entering his plea. Id. at 911, 564 N.E.2d at 654-
55, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 44-45.
194. 76 N.Y.2d 618, 564 N.E.2d 611, 563 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1990).
195. NEW YORK CITY CHARTER § 2604 (b)(15) provides in pertinent part:
No elected official, deputy mayor.... or other public servant who is charged with
substantial policy discretion
... may be a member of the national or state committee of a political party, serve
as an assembly district leader of a political party or serve as a chair or as an officer
of the county committee or county executive committee of a political party.
196. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged violations of Article I, § 1, [right against dis-
franchisement], Article I, § 8 [freedom of speech], Article I, § 9 [right of association],
Article I, § 11 [equal protection], and Article II, § 1 [right to vote] of the New York State
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in a majority opinion authored by Judge Simons, rejected all
claims.
Ruling that the provision does not infringe upon the funda-
mental political and voting rights of any identifiable class,197 but
instead applies neutrally 98 - i.e., regardless of political affilia-
tion or political viewpoint - the court held that the provision's
"at most, only incidental [burdens]"' 99 should be sustained as
long as "rationally related to some conceivable and legitimate
State interest."2 00 Not surprisingly, the majority had no diffi-
culty in finding that standard satisfied. In light of the back-
ground of corruption against which the provision was enacted,20'
the legislative purposes - i.e., eliminating the conflicts that
arise whenever an individual holds both partisan and political
office, and reducing the opportunities for corruption that dual
office-holding affords - were more than sufficient, in the
court's view, to defeat the equal protection challenge.2 2
As for the freedoms of association and expression, the rights
of political parties were not sufficiently burdened, according to
the majority, to invalidate the charter provision.203 The majority,
in fact, held unequivocally that "there has been no impairment
of plaintiff political parties associational rights, either directly or
Constitution. Golden, 76 N.Y.2d at 623, 564 N.E.2d at 613, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 3.
To the court's evident puzzlement and displeasure, however, the plaintiffs failed to
develop their state-based arguments and relied, instead, on federal case law. In a sepa-
rate footnote the Court remarked:
Although plaintiffs rest their case solely on State grounds, they have not distin-
guished the State constitutional provisions from their Federal counterparts nor
have they attempted to demonstrate how the State provisions, either singly or in
combination, establish any more or greater rights than those guaranteed to the
citizens of New York by the Federal Constitution. They argue only that funda-
mental rights guaranteed them by the State Constitution have been impaired and
seek to persuade the Court that § 2604(b)(15) cannot survive strict scrutiny. Para-
doxically, in doing so plaintiffs deny the applicability of the few available State
precedents and rely principally on Federal law.
76 N.Y.2d at 623 n.2, 564 N.E.2d at 613 n.2, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 3 n.2 (citations omitted).
197. Id. at 626, 564 N.E.2d at 614-15, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 4-5.
198. Id. at 626, 564 N.E.2d at 615, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 5.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 627, 564 N.E.2d at 616, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
202. Id. at 626, 564 N.E.2d at 615, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 5.
203. Id.
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* indirectly. 2 04 Not only is the provision "entirely neutral, '205 but
it simply does not, asserted the majority, deprive political par-
ties or their members of the rights to associate with whomever
they chose, to identify their membership, to express opinions, to
select an internal organization, or to select party leaders or can-
didates for city office - as long as the same person is not se-
lected for both positions.2 06 Finally, regarding the expression
and association rights of the individual plaintiffs, the court sum-
marily dismissed as "de minimis" any burden imposed, °0 and
thus, had little difficulty holding such burden to be justified by
the already identified important government interests.
In a forceful dissent, Judge Hancock, joined by Judge
Titone, decried the majority's "seeming break"20 8 with long
standing New York tradition to provide the "broadest possible
protection"20 9 to expression-related freedoms. "Unquestion-
ably," protested Judge Hancock, "[the provision] infringes on
the rights of political parties and their adherents to select and
elect candidates of their choice to positions in city government,"
and at the same time "abridges the associational rights of par-
ties [to choose their] leaders."2 10 Moreover, the "debasement of
these constitutional prerogatives of political parties is unques-
tionably significant,' 21  continued Judge Hancock, and there-
204. Id. at 628, 564 N.E.2d at 616-17, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 6-7 (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 628, 564 N.E.2d at 616, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 630, 564 N.E.2d at 617, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 7. Indeed, in a footnoted reply to
the dissent's charge that the majority applied a standard less onerous than strict scru-
tiny, the majority seemed to say that no review was necessary at all: "[S]tandards of
review are applied only to provisions which impair constitutionally protected rights.
Since there is no significant impairment of plaintiffs' speech and associational rights in
this case, there is no need to engage in an examination of whether [the provision] with-
stands strict scrutiny analysis." Id. at 630 n.3, 564 N.E.2d at 618 n.3, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 8
n.3 (citations omitted).
208. Id. at 632, 564 N.E.2d at 619, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
209. Id. See also id. at 634 n.5, 564 N.E.2d at 621 n.5, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 12 n.5.
210. Id. at 634, 564 N.E.2d at 620, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
211. Id. at 636, 564 N.E.2d at 622, 563 N.YS.2d at 12. As put by Judge Hancock:
Can there be any measure which encroaches more directly on the core freedom of
a political party than one which restricts - on the basis of the candidate's activi-
ties within the party - a political party's power to perform the primary function
for which it exists: the selection, nomination and election of persons who, in its
opinion, are best suited to represent the party as candidates? And can any mea-
sure more surely curtail the autonomy of a political association than one which
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fore, should be tested under strict scrutiny analysis. 212 That test,
Judge Hancock asserted, is not met.
213
The Charter provision, which regulates "who the candidates
and party leaders should be,"214 is hardly, in Judge Hancock's
view, "narrowly tailored to accomplish the intended result of
preventing corruption. '215 At the least, less drastic measures,
such as full financial disclosure and free access to government
records, are available.216 Judge Hancock concluded:
Corruption in political and public office .. .cannot be tolerated
and, to be sure, all lawful steps to stop it are required. But it is
far better, and unquestionably less harmful, to rely on an alert
citizenry, diligent prosecutors and resourceful reporters to combat
corruption - in ways which are consistent with our democratic
process - than to resort to legislation that strikes at the very
heart of the associational freedoms on which the process is
based.2"
In Johnson Newspaper Corp. v. Melino,1 s Judge Hancock,
this time writing for the court in a unanimous decision, rejected
the claim of a newspaper publisher to a public right of access to
professional disciplinary hearings - in this case, a hearing in-
volving a dentist.2 9 With regard to federal law, the court held
that the First Amendment provides no such right because pro-
fessional hearings have traditionally been closed and because
there was no showing that public access would play any "signifi-
forces it to choose between using its talented advocates to direct its own affairs
and using them to carry out its policies and public objectives as candidates for
political office?
Id., 564 N.E.2d at 621, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
212. Id. at 639, 564 N.E.2d at 624, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 14. Judge Hancock concluded:
In sum, the undeniable effect of [the charter provision] is that registered party
voters are deprived of their rights (1) to select seven categories of party officials as
elected city officers and (2) to choose specified officials as their party leaders. Be-
cause [the provision] implicates fundamental rights under article I, §§ 1, 8 and 9
of the State Constitution, the provision must pass strict scrutiny.
Id. at 640-41, 564 N.E.2d at 625, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
213. Id. at 641-43, 564 N.E.2d at 625-26, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 15-16.
214. Id. at 638, 564 N.E.2d at 623, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
215. Id. at 642, 564 N.E.2d at 626, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 643, 564 N.E.2d at 626, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 16 (emphasis added).
218. 77 N.Y.2d 1, 564 N.E.2d 1046, 563 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1990).
219. Id. at 4, 564 N.E.2d at 1047, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
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cant positive role".22
With regard to state law, the court, while acknowledging
that it has oftentimes found New York expressional freedoms
more protective than their federal counterparts, noted that
"there is no such precedent [in this state] with respect to the
right of access." '221 Moreover, the court continued, the publisher
"cited no authority and ma[de] no persuasive argument for the
proposition that our State Constitution affords a protected right
of access to disciplinary hearings ....
In Seelig v. Koehler,22s the Court of Appeals rendered its
third major drug-testing decision in the last four years.2 4 In its
unanimous 1987 Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v.
Board of Education225 decision, the court invalidated a program
of mandatory urinalysis of probationary public school teachers
on the ground that there was no individualized reasonable suspi-
cion of drug abuse. 226 The following year, in Caruso v. Ward,22 7
220. Id. at 7-8, 564 N.E.2d at 1049, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 383 (citing Press-Enterprises
Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986)).
221. Id. at 8, 564 N.E.2d at 1049, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
222. Id. The court also did not find the state's common law supportive of public
access. Rather, the court, reviewing precedent, concluded that state case law reflected a
policy of keeping disciplinary hearings involving licensed professionals confidential - at
least until finally determined - even in the absence of a specific statutory provision
mandating closure. Id. at 10, 564 N.E.2d at 1050, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
The court also applied the state's common law to a free press issue in Finger v.
Omni Publications Int'l, 77 N.Y.2d 138, 566 N.E.2d 141, 564 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1990). This
time, however, the court found the common law supportive of the claim that, despite the
proscriptions of the state Civil Rights Law, sections 50 and 51 prohibiting the non-con-
sensual use of a person's photograph for advertising, the publisher was free to use the
plaintiffs' photograph in connection with a news article in which the plaintiffs were not
specifically involved. Id. at 143, 566 N.E.2d at 144-45, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 1017-18. Noting
that a "newsworthiness" exception has been read into the statute's proscriptions by the
courts of the state, id. at 141-142, 566 N.E.2d at 143, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 1016, and that the
exception should be applied liberally to avoid judicial intervention into "reasonable edi-
torial judgment and discretion," the court held that the non-consensual use of a photo-
graph by a news publisher was actionable only where there was "no real relationship"
between the photograph and the article, or even the theme of the article, or where the
article is a patent advertisement in disguise. Id. at 142, 566 N.E.2d at 144, 564 N.Y.S.2d
at 1016.
223. 76 N.Y.2d 87, 556 N.E.2d 125, 556 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1990).
224. Id. See also Caruso v. Ward, 72 N.Y.2d 432, 530 N.E.2d 850, 534 N.Y.S.2d 143
(1988); Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers. v. Board of Educ., 70 N.Y.2d 57, 510
N.E.2d 325, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1987).
225. 70 N.Y.2d 57, 510 N.E.2d 325, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1987).
226. Id. at 68-69, 510 N.E.2d at 331, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
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in what Judge Kaye called "an abrupt about-face,"228 the court
upheld a program of wholly suspicionless, random urine-testing
of special narcotics officers in the New York City Police Depart-
ment.2 2 9 In 1990, in Seelig,2 30 over the dissenting opinion of
Chief Judge Wachtler - the author of the court's unanimous
opinion in Patchogue, but a member of the Caruso major-
ity - the court approved a drug-testing program instituted by
the New York City Department of Correction, requiring random
urinalysis of every uniformed member of the Department.2 31
Speaking through Judge Bellacosa, who had also written the
majority opinion in Caruso, the court in Seelig once again held
that Patchogue presented no obstacle to the mandatory suspi-
cionless testing; the individuals to be tested, according to the
majority, enjoyed a drastically diminished expectation of privacy
in their work. 22 "[D]espite the hyperbolic attributions of the
dissenting opinion," wrote Judge Bellacosa, the Seelig majority
was concluding "no more" than that
the particular combination of crucial circumstances comprising
the paramilitary workplace milieu of jail guards, [and] their se-
verely diminished privacy expectations under a sedulous set of
testing procedures, in the face of the significant State interest,
satisfy the analytic and constitutional underpinnings of Patch-
ogue and Caruso - a concededly rigorous set of standards.232
Specifically, the assertedly still-"rigorous" Patchogue stan-
dards were met, in the majority's view, because correction of-
ficers are "traditionally among the most heavily regulated" pub-
lic employees;23" because the "jail guards [therefore] retain the
barest minimal privacy expectation; 235 and because the "pre-
vention, detection and resolution of the myriad daily crises in
227. 72 N.Y.2d 432, 530 N.E.2d 850, 534 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1988).
228. Id. at 442, 530 N.E.2d at 855, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 148. (Kaye, J., dissenting). Judge
Kaye's dissent was joined by Judge Titone.
229. Id. at 441-42, 530 N.E.2d at 854-55, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
230. 76 N.Y.2d 87, 556 N.E.2d 125, 556 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1990).
231. Id. at 89, 556 N.E.2d at 125, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
232. Id. at 90, 556 N.E.2d at 126, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 91, 556 N.E.2d at 127, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
235. Id. at 93, 556 N.E.2d at 128, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 835. As restated by Judge Bel-
lacosa, the correction officers "suffer a reduced order of constitutional circumspection
proportionate to their accepted level of humble privacy expectations." Id.
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this netherworld demand the acutest sensory awareness, undul-
led by the use of illicit drugs." '236 Hence, concluded the majority,
the random urinalysis program for all uniformed officers "must
be allowed" as a "proportionate and constitutional means" to re-
duce the drug traffic into and within city jails.2 7
Chief Judge Wachtler, joining the Caruso dissenters Judges
Kaye and Titone, accused the majority of transforming the "nar-
row [Caruso] exception into a general warrant .. . ."'I' More-
over, he argued, the entire uniformed membership of the city's
correction department cannot be compared to the specialized,
"elite" corps in Caruso, who must fight "the war against drug
trafficking . . . in fish-bowl like circumstances undreamed of by
Calpurnia herself. '2 39
Explained Chief Judge Wachtler, the only distinction be-
tween the officers in Seelig and ordinary police officers is that
uniformed correction officers work in a "controlled environment,
* . . under close supervision and constant scrutiny."4 0 But these
circumstances, he continued, only mean that "the employer here
is in a better position than any to detect illegal drug use," and
therefore, that there is "no basis for relieving [the correction de-
partment] of the minimal reasonable suspicion requirement."'"
236. Id. Judge Bellacosa added that, "analogously to the narcotics officers in Caruso
who regularly deal with 'the drug world inhabitant out in the hard streets,'" the "jail
guards" in Seelig constantly "interact with the most dangerous of society's concentrated
mass in the confines of their walled symbiotic universe." Id. at 95, 556 N.E.2d at 129, 556
N.Y.S.2d at 836.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 97, 556 N.E.2d at 130, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 837.
239. Id. at 96-97, 556 N.E.2d at 130, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 837 (quoting Caruso v. Ward,
72 N.Y.2d 432, 441, 530 N.E.2d 850, 854, 534 N.Y.S.2d 143, 146 (1988)).
240. Id. at.99-100, 556 N.E.2d at 132, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 839.
241. Id. at 100, 556 N.E.2d at 132, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 839. Chief Judge Wachtler,
warning of the ultimate ramifications of the majority's adoption of the city's justifica-
tions for the random drug-testing concluded:
The government can always argue, as the Commissioner does here, that random
urine testing is the only effective means for detecting drug abuse .... And argu-
ments can always be made that one group or another serving the public, even in
the private sector, should be above suspicion of drug use and thus subject to ran-
dom urine testing ordered by the government. The arguments are difficult to resist
because urine testing is effective and the eradication of illegal drug use is such a
desirable goal.
Id. at 100-101, 556 N.E.2d at 132, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 839.
Indeed, as Judge Kaye had argued in her Caruso dissent, the "criteria the court
identifies [and has now reaffirmed in Seelig] are applicable to a wide array of public
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2. Due Procedure
In Savastano v. Nurnberg,242 the court rejected a due pro-
cess challenge to the nonconsensual transfer of involuntarily
committed, mentally ill patients from local acute-care facilities
to long-term state institutions without prior judicial approval. 3
"Assuming, without deciding" 244 that such a transfer implicates
a constitutional liberty interest, the court, speaking through
Judge Titone, held that the "procedural protections provided by
the regulatory scheme at issue here sufficiently safeguard the
[state and federal] due process rights of those involuntary pa-
tients who object to being transferred. '24 5
Balancing the individual and state interests involved in re-
quiring additional judicial safeguards, the court noted that the
transfers at issue involve primarily medical judgments about the
employees - even teachers [as in Patchogue] who are in an environment where drug
abuse is particularly high." Caruso, 72 N.Y.2d at 443, 530 N.E.2d at 856, 534 N.Y.S.2d at
148 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
In McKenzie v. Jackson, 75 N.Y.2d 995, 556 N.E.2d 1072, 557 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1990),
the court applied Seelig, decided the same day, to uphold the dismissal of a probationary
correction officer who had tested positive in the random urinalysis program just ap-
proved. Id. at 96, 556 N.E.2d at 1072, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
In another privacy and personal autonomy case, Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 75 N.Y.2d 218,
551 N.E.2d 77, 551 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1990), the court relied solely on state common law to
uphold a patient's claim, asserted on federal and state constitutional grounds, of a right
to refuse lifesaving medical treatment. Id. at 226, 551 N.E.2d at 81, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
The court majority, in a narrowly drafted opinion by Chief Judge Wachtler, ruled that
the lower court judge erred in authorizing the hospital to administer blood transfusions
over the mentally competent patient's religious-based objections - at least without first
giving the patient an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 224, 551 N.E.2d at 80, 551 N.Y.S.2d
at 879. Noting that the common law right is not absolute, the court concluded, nonethe-
less, that in the absence of some identified state interest, - i.e., the hospital had
"point[ed] to no law or regulation," - the non-terminal, parental patient was entitled
to decline the blood transfusions. Id. at 230, 551 N.E.2d at 83, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 882.
Judges Simons and Hancock concurred in separate opinions. They agreed with the
majority's result under the facts of the case, but shared each other's rejection of the
majority's proposition that, in the absence of some specific legislative expression of soci-
ety's interest in preserving life and protecting innocent third parties e.g., protecting in-
fant children from the loss of a parent, an otherwise healthy parent of infant children
has an unqualified right to refuse lifesaving treatment. Id. at 232-39, 551 N.E.2d at 84-
89, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 883-88 (Simons, J., concurring, Hancock, J., concurring).
242. 77 N.Y.2d 300, 569 N.E.2d 421, 567 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1990).
243. Id. at 307, 569 N.E.2d at 424, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
244. Id.
245. Id. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.11 (McKinney 1988); N.Y. COMP. CODEs R.
& REGS., §517.4 (1962).
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patients' therapeutic needs that, in the court's view, are best left
to psychiatrists rather than judicial or administrative hearing of-
ficers. 46 Moreover, the regulatory scheme affords an objecting
patient an appeal prior to the transfer, personally or through a
representative, before the director of the sending institution.2 47
The director is required to review the patient's history and ob-
jections and to render a determination whether the transfer
would be in the patient's best interest.24 8 Also, the receiving in-
stitution may reject any transfer it deems inappropriate and a
patient may obtain judicial review of a transfer determination
and seek injunctive relief pending the court proceedings.4 9 Ad-
ditionally, regardless of the outcome of the judicial review, the
receiving institution may hold the patient no longer than the ini-
tially authorized period in the absence of a further court order
extending the duration. 50
To require that nonconsensual transfers be pre-approved in
a "full-scale judicial hearing,"251 with the panoply of trial rights
and adherence to rules of evidence, the court continued, would
add little procedural protection to the safeguards already pro-
vided against the risk of erroneous medical judgment.25 12 Finally,
while the real interests of patients in prior judicial hearings are
minimal, the state's interest in avoiding the attendant "adminis-
trative and fiscal burdens "253 is especially substantial, according
to the court, because of the "diversion of scarce resources from
the care and treatment of mentally ill patients" that would re-
sult. 54 Hence, though acknowledging that "a patient's interest
in not being inappropriately transferred ... is not insubstan-
tial, 21 5 5 Judge Titone, for the majority, concluded that the ex-
isting procedural scheme satisfies state and federal constitu-
246. Savastano, 77 N.Y.2d at 309, 569 N.E.2d at 424, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
247. Id. at 306, 569 N.E.2d at 423, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 307, 569 N.E.2d at 423-24, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 620-21. See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L.
& R. 7805 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1991).
250. Savastano, 77 N.Y.2d at 307, 569 N.E.2d at 424, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 621. See N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.110) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1991).
251. Savastano, 77 N.Y.2d at 307, 569 N.E.2d at 424, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
252. Id. at 309, 569 N.E.2d at 425, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 310, 569 N.E.2d at 425, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
255. Id. at 308, 569 N.E.2d at 424, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
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tional due process. 56
Judge Bellacosa concurred alone.25 7 He objected neither to
the result nor to the statutory or regulatory scheme. He simply
did not believe that any constitutional rights were involved in
the case. 25 In an entry in the court's remittitur, Judge Bel-
lacosa noted his concurrence solely "on the threshold ground
that no constitutionally cognizable liberty interest is implicated
by the statutory and regulatory scheme at issue. '2 59
The court rejected another claim of right to a full judicial
hearing in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State.2 60
There, the court upheld the arbitration provision of the New
Car Lemon Law2 61 against a challenge that it contravened the
constitutional right to trial by jury. 62
Several trade associations representing automobile manu-
facturers, importers, and distributors sought a declaration that
the provision allowing the consumer unilaterally to invoke com-
pulsory arbitration violated the state constitutional mandate
that "[tirial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been
guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate
forever. 2 63 Speaking through Judge Simons, the court explained
that the constitutional provision, first enacted in 1777, was in-
tended to guarantee a jury trial in all cases in which it had been
provided at common law. 6 4 If the relief sought was legal, a jury
256. Id. at 310, 569 N.E.2d at 425, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
257. Id. at 310, 569 N.E.2d at 426, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 623.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. 75 N.Y.2d 175, 550 N.E.2d 919, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1990).
261. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a(k) affords the consumer the option of arbitrating a
claim of entitlement to a replacement vehicle or a refund, and, if the consumer does
choose arbitration, the vehicle manufacturer is compelled to participate. N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW. § 198-a(k) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1991).
262. See N.Y. CONST., art. I, § 2. The arbitration provision was also challenged as an
impermissible abridgement of State Supreme Court's jurisdiction, see N.Y. CONST., art.
VI, § 7, and as an unauthorized delegation of judicial authority, see N.Y. CONST., art. VI,
§§ 1, 7. All challenges were rejected. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 75 N.Y.2d at 183-84, 550
N.E.2d at 923, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
263. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 75 N.Y.2d at 180, 550 N.E.2d at 921, 551 N.Y.S.2d
at 472 (quoting N.Y. CONST., art. I, § 2).
264. Id. at 180-81, 550 N.E.2d at 921, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 472. With minor, non-sub-
stantive changes in terminology, the constitutional provision was reenacted with the
adoption oT each new state constitution. Id. at 181, 550 N.E.2d at 921, 551 N.Y.S.2d at
472.
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trial was required; but not, according to the court, if the nature
and substance of what was sought was equitable. 6
Thus, continued the court, whether a jury trial must be pro-
vided under the Lemon Law, depends upon the nature of reme-
dies created by the statute.2" Because they are equitable, wrote
Judge Simons, no jury trial is necessary.267 The replacement
remedy is "analogous to specific performance;" it is designed to
produce "the same performance promised under the [automobile
purchase] contract."2' 8 As for the refund remedy, unlike com-
mon law breach of warranty or revocation of acceptance, it per-
mits the consumer to seek a "recision and restoration of the sta-
tus quo ante, similar to an action for restitution, and is equitable
in nature. 26
9
In lone dissent, Judge Titone argued that the arbitration
provision of the Lemon Law constitutes an impermissible dele-
gation of judicial authority. 70 "[T]here can be little doubt,"
Judge Titone contended, that the function the statute "assigns
to private arbitrators is judicial in nature." 17 He explained:
Under the statute, manufacturers are compelled to submit to
binding arbitration breach of warranty disputes that differ very
little from those that formerly would have been adjudicated in
the courts. Arbitrators are empowered to take evidence, to sub-
poena witnesses and documents, and make binding determina-
tions of fact and law. These traits are unique characteristics of
the sovereign judicial function.272
In response, the majority noted that the Lemon Law arbi-
trators are given narrow powers, which must be exercised under
very specific guidelines to resolve fact-specific disputes, and are
restricted to granting one of only two specified types of relief.2 73
265. Id. at 181, 550 N.E.2d at 921, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 472.
266. Id. at 181, 550 N.E.2d at 922, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 473.
267. Id. at 182, 550 N.E.2d at 922, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 473.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 183, 550 N.E.2d.at 922, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 473.
270. Id. at 188-95, 550 N.E.2d at 926-30, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 477-81 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
271. Id. at 190, 550 N.E.2d at 927, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
272. Id. (citations omitted). See also discussion of Judge Titone's dissent in Scalza,
supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
273. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 75 N.Y.2d at 186, 550 N.E.2d at 924-25, 551
N.Y.S.2d at 475-76.
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The legislature "has merely created a new limited class of dis-
putes," the majority continued, and has "provided a procedure
for resolving them .... "274 Finally, noted the majority, the judi-
cial "traits" identified by the dissenter are characteristic of all
dispute-resolvers, not just courts,2 75 and in any event, "expanded
judicial review" is available under the Lemon Law for all com-
pulsory arbitration awards.276
3. Equality277
In People v. Kern,2 78 the court held that "purposeful racial
discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges,... ex-
ercised by the prosecution or the defense" is prohibited under
the New York Constitution.279 The unanimous court, speaking
through Judge Alexander, ruled that race-based peremptory
challenges violate both the Civil Rights and Equal Protection
Clauses of Article I, § 11 of the state's charter .28  The court ex-
plained that, because jury service in New York is a "civil
right"281 - i.e., it is both a constitutional privilege of citizen-
ship 282 and a statutory entitlement and duty - 253 denial solely
274. Id. at 187, 550 N.E.2d at 925, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Court of Appeals decisions involving race-based peremptory challenges of ju-
rors are treated herein as "equality" cases, even though they arise in the context of crim-
inal prosecutions, because the state constitutional issue presented in those cases is
predominantly one of equal protection and the civil right to serve on a jury regardless of
race, creed, color or religion. See supra notes 280-84 and accompanying text.
278. 75 N.Y.2d 638, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1990). The case grew out of
the highly publicized Howard Beach incident in which a group of white teenagers at-
tacked three black men. Id. at 643-46, 554 N.E.2d at 1236-38, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 648-50.
279. Id. at 653, 554 N.E.2d at 1243, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 655 (emphasis added).
280. Id. at 650, 554 N.E.2d at 1241, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 653. N.Y. CONST., art. I, § 11
provides:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any
subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be
subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other person or by any
firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the
state.
The first sentence is the equal protection clause; the second is the civil rights clause. See
Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 650-51, 554 N.E.2d at 1241, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
281. Id. at 651, 554 N.E.2d at 1242, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
282. Id. See N.Y. CONST., art. I, § 7, § 1.
283. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 652-53, 554 N.E.2d at 1242, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 655. See N.Y.
JUD. LAW § 500 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1991) (providing that all eligible citizens shall
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on the basis of race violates the proscription of the Civil Rights
Clause against "any discrimination in [a person's] civil rights by
any other person," private organization, or state authority.18
Moreover, according to the court, "the State is inevitably
and inextricably involved 2 8 5 in excluding peremptorily chal-
lenged jurors. State statute authorizes peremptories 2s and sum-
287 "imoning citizens for jury service, and "it is the Judge, with the
full coercive authority of the State, who enforces the discrimina-
tory decision by ordering the excused juror to leave the court-
room escorted by uniformed court officers or Deputy Sheriffs.9 288
The court, thus, had little hesitation in concluding that "the ju-
dicial enforcement of racially discriminatory peremptory chal-
lenges exercised by defense counsel constitutes 'State action' for
the purpose of our State equal protection provision, ' 289 and
therefore, that race-based peremptories by the defense, as well
as by the prosecution, violates the guarantee of equal protection
in the New York Constitution.
Consequently, continued the court, once the prosecution has
made a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the defense
counsel's exercise of peremptory challenges, the defense must
demonstrate "nonpretextual, racially neutral explanations for
[the] challenges. '290 Emphasizing the "fundamental concerns"
involved, whether it is the defense or the prosecution that en-
gages in racial peremptories, the court explained:
Racial discrimination in the selection of juries harms the ex-
cluded juror by denying this opportunity to participate in the ad-
ministration of justice, and it harms society by impairing the in-
tegrity of the criminal trial process.29 1
have the opportunity and obligation to perform jury service); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 13
(McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1991) (providing that an otherwise qualified citizen shall not
be disqualified from petit jury service on account of race).
284. N.Y. CONST., art. 1, § 11 (emphasis added). See Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 653, 554
N.E.2d at 1242, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
285. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 656, 554 N.E.2d at 1245, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
286. Id. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.25 (McKinney 1982).
287. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 656, 554 N.E.2d at 1245, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 657. See N.Y. JuD.
LAW § 516 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1991).
288. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 657, 554 N.E.2d at 1245, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
289. Id., 554 N.E.2d at 1246, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
290. Id. at 657-58, 554 N.E.2d at 1246, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
291. Id. at 652, 554 N.E.2d at 1242, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 654 (citations omitted). In Peo-
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Having thus extended the prohibition against racially dis-
criminatory peremptory challenges in Kern, the Court of Ap-
peals nevertheless refused, in two other cases decided in 1990, to
grant relief to defendants who were allegedly victimized by such
discrimination. In People v. Hernandez,292 the court rejected a
defendant's claim that the prosecutor's peremptory exclusion of
all Spanish-speaking Hispanic jurors violated both federal and
state equal protection.293 The majority, in an opinion by Judge
Bellacosa, held that the "prosecution [had] responded with a
satisfactory nondiscriminatory explanation for excluding the
only Latino jurors '294 when the assistant district attorney told
the trial judge that the Spanish-speaking jurors seemed hesitant,
because of their knowledge of Spanish, to accept the official in-
terpreter's English translation of the Spanish-proffered testi-
mony.298 "It was for the trial judge," according to Judge Bel-
lacosa, "to determine if the prosecutor's explanation was
pretextual or real and justified. 29 1
ple v. Jenkins, 75 N.Y.2d 550, 554 N.E.2d 47, 555 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1990), addressing only
the federal constitutional issue (apparently, no state constitutional issue was raised) id.
at 553, 554 N.E.2d at 48, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 11, the unanimous court, again through the pen
of Judge Alexander, held that racially motivated peremptory exclusion of jurors by the
prosecution violates equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, even if the
prosecution does not exclude from the jury all members of the race in question. As Judge
Alexander explained: "For the purposes of equal protection, the constitutional violation
is the exclusion of any blacks solely because of their race. If any blacks are so excluded,
it is of no moment that the jury nevertheless contains a token number of blacks." Id. at
559, 554 N.E.2d at 51-52, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 14-15 (emphasis in original).
292. 75 N.Y.2d 350, 552 N.E.2d 621, 553 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1990), affirmed as a matter of
federal law, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991). The Supreme Court majority held that the "trial
court did not commit clear error in choosing to believe the reasons given by the prosecu-
tor." Id. at 1873. Justice Stevens in dissent, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun,
argued that even assuming the prosecutor's good faith, "the justification proffered was
insufficient to dispel the existing inference of racial animus." Id. at 1877. Echoing Judge.
Kaye's objections, the dissenters explained that the facially race-neutral justification ad-
vanced by the prosecutor "would inevitably result in a disproportionate disqualification
of Spanish-speaking venirepersons," thereby serving as "merely a proxy for a discrimina-
tory practice." Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 356, 552 N.E.2d at 623, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
295. Id.
296. Id. Judge Titone, while joining in the majority opinion, wrote separately to sug-
gest that, "rather than developing a complex set of judicially imposed limitations and
standards, the most constructive course would be for the Legislature to take a hard look
at the existing peremptory system with a view toward determining whether it is still
viable, at least as it is presently constituted." Id. at 359, 552 N.E.2d at 625, 553 N.Y.S.2d
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Judge Kaye, joined in dissent by Judge Hancock, disagreed
that such deference to the trial court was appropriate in a case
of this kind." ' Initially, Judge Kaye emphasized her view that in
a matter of "such day-to-day vital importance locally,""' the
citizens of the state would be best served by "an authoritative
body of State law instead of being held in suspense, case-by-
case," by what the Supreme Court might decide as it fleshes out
the scope and limits of the federal prohibition against race-
based peremptories. 2" As to the merits, Judge Kaye argued that
for the Court of Appeals merely to defer to the trial court's ac-
ceptance of "some ostensibly neutral ground" asserted by the
prosecution,3°0 would be tantamount to surrendering "the role of
this court in defining and protecting [this] nascent constitu-
tional right" 0 1 of criminal defendants.
Despite the majority's reliance on the Spanish-speaking ju-
rors' supposed hesitance to accept the official court translation,
Judge Kaye noted that the trial judge was, in fact, satisfied with
the jurors' reassurances. e30 Moreover, Judge Kaye added, there
was no indication on the record that any non-Hispanic members
of the jury were ever asked if they too understood Spanish.303
"[G]iven the potential for disparate impact and the meager rec-
ord made by the People on the issue, '"304 the prosecution had
not, in the dissenters' view, satisfied its burden of rebutting the
prima facie case of discrimination.306
Finally, addressing the untoward implications of "language-
based" exclusion of jurors, especially in New York, Judge Kaye
concluded:
Where, as here, a language-based reason for exercising peremp-
tory challenges is intimately linked to ethnicity and has the same
impact as one that is, in fact, ethnically based, the People's offer
of a neutral explanation must be subjected to enhanced scrutiny.
at 89 (footnote omitted).
297. Id. at 361, 552 N.E.2d at 627, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
298. Id. at 360, 552 N.E.2d at 626, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
299. Id. (emphasis added).
300. Id. at 361, 552 N.E.2d at 627, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 363, 552 N.E.2d at 628, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
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. . Otherwise, absent that somewhat more demanding standard,
the prosecution's removal of all persons of a certain ethnic group,
whether intentionally or not, can all too readily be justified by the
mere recitation of a language-based reason. In this State, with its
varied and often concentrated ethnic populations, the inevitable
effect on the composition of our juries of permitting such lan-
guage-based justifications. without close inspection would be
intolerable.30 6
The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision has affirmed the Court of
Appeals' ruling in Hernandez as a matter of federal constitu-
tional law.307
In People v. Green,308 the Court of Appeals rejected another
defendant's claim of discriminatory peremptories.30 In Green,
however, the court did not reach the merits. Rather, in a cur-
sory, unsigned memorandum over the dissenting opinion of two
members of the court, the majority held that the defendant's
guilty plea waived any right to appeal the prosecutor's system-
atic exclusion of blacks from the jury.310 Asserting that "[w]e all
agree completely with the policy considerations that warrant
remedying and ending Batson violations in the selection of trial
juries," '' the majority nonetheless, on the same day it decided
Kern, summarily refused to permit the defendant to complain
about racially-motivated peremptories.3 12 The court merely ex-
plained that, "[ilnasmuch as we have held that the whole jury
trial right may be waived, there is no basis in law or logic for
306. Id. at 363-64, 552 N.E.2d at 628, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
307. See Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991). The Supreme Court ma-
jority held that the "trial court did not commit clear error in choosing to believe the
reasons given by the prosecutor." Id. at 1873. Justice Stevens, in dissent, joined by Jus-
tices Marshall and Blackmun, argued that even assuming the prosecutor's good faith,
"the justification proffered was insufficient to dispel the existing inference of racial ani-
mus." Id. at 1877. Echoing Judge Kaye's objections, the dissenters explained that the
facially race-neutral justification advanced by the prosecutor "would inevitably result in
a disproportionate disqualification of Spanish-speaking venireperson," thereby serving as
"merely a proxy for discriminatory practice." Id.
308. 75 N.Y.2d 902, 553 N.E.2d 1331, 554 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1990).
309. Id.
310. Id. at 904-05, 553 N.E.2d at 1332, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
311. Id. at 904, 553 N.E.2d at 1332, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 822. (citing Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986) (racially-motivated peremptory challenges by the prosecution held to
violate federal constitutional equal protection)).
312. Id. at 905, 553 N.E.2d at 1332, 554 -N.Y.S.2d at 822.
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permitting one component of the plenary right to survive a
guilty plea. 313
In dissent, Judge Hancock, joined by Judge Alexander, ar-
gued that the only question before the court was whether racial
discrimination in peremptory challenges "affects the fundamen-
tal fairness of a trial or implicates societal interests in the integ-
rity of the criminal process. ' 4 That is the test, explained the
dissenters, that the court had consistently applied in prior cases
to determine whether a defendant's claim survives a guilty plea
and thus could be raised on appeal.3 1 5 A prosecutor's race-based
exercise of peremptories is such a "fundamental matter," in-
sisted Judge Hancock, because it does "affect the basic fairness
of a criminal trial [and does] implicate society's interests in the
integrity of the process itself."316
Moreover, the dissent noted, discriminatory peremptories
by the prosecution might well be the very reason a defendant
chooses to plead guilty rather than proceed to a jury
trial - i.e., a trial by a racially-unbalanced jury. 1 Finally, ar-
gued Judge Hancock, it should make no difference whether a de-
fendant is convicted on a guilty plea or a jury verdict. He
explained:
Racial discrimination in jury selection is so anathema to the man-
date of fundamental fairness in our criminal process that no con-
viction infected by it - whether that conviction be by verdict or
guilty plea - should be permitted to stand ...... "Not only the
individual defendant but the public at large is entitled to assur-
ance that there shall be full observance and enforcement of the
cardinal right of a defendant to a fair trial. '31 8
313. Id. The majority, stating its rule otherwise, said: "By pleading guilty instead of
going to trial, the defendant waived all of his trial rights .... " Id. at 904, 553 N.E.2d at
1332, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
314. Id. at 905, 553 N.E.2d at 1332, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
315. Id. at 905-07, 553 N.E.2d at 1332-34, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 822-24.
316. Id. at 909, 553 N.E.2d at 1335, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 825. See also id. at 910-11, 553
N.E.2d at 1335-36, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 825-26. Compare with People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at
652, 554 N.E.2d at 1242, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 655, supra note 291 and accompanying text.
317. Id. at 911, 553 N.E.2d at 1337, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
318. Id. at 911, 553 N.E.2d at 1336, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 826 (emphasis in original)
(quoting People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 238, 326 N.E.2d 787, 791, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213,
218 (1975)).
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In Forti v. New York State Ethics Commission,319 the court
rejected another equal protection claim arising in an entirely dif-
ferent context. In Forti, the court upheld the "revolving door"
provisions of the New York Ethics In Government Act320 against
equal protection and due process challenges.32 1 As a matter of
both state and federal equal protection, the court had little diffi-
culty discerning a rational basis to justify the statute's imposi-
tion of stricter post-employment limitations upon executive
branch employees than are imposed on those who work for the
legislature.32 2 "[T]here was adequate basis for the Legislature to
conclude that administrative agencies are more susceptible to
the ethical problems associated specifically with 'revolving door'
employment, ' 323 according to the court, because of the "funda-
mental institutional differences" between the Executive and
Legislative Branches.32 "
As for the due process challenge asserted on both state and
federal grounds, the court rejected the contention that the re-
volving door restrictions prevent former executive branch em-
ployees - including attorneys such as the Forti plain-
tiffs - from pursuing their careers.32 5 Rather, explained the
unanimous court, speaking through Judge Titone, the post-em-
ployment restrictions in question "merely forbid them from ac-
cepting employment in a limited class of cases that poses the
greatest potential for the unfair exploitation of the contacts they
319. 75 N.Y.2d 596, 554 N.E.2d 876, 555 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1990).
320. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73(a) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1991). Under the "revolv-
ing door" provisions in question, separated executive branch employees may never ap-
pear before their former agencies on matters in which they were directly involved during
their government service; nor may they appear before their former agencies in relation to
any matter for two years after separation from state service. See Forti, 75 N.Y.2d at 606,
554 N.E.2d 879, 555 N.Y.S.2d 238.
321. Forti, 75 N.Y.2d at 617-18, 554 N.E.2d at 886, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 245.
322. Id. at 612-14, 554 N.E.2d at 882-84, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 242-43.
323. Id. at 613, 554 N.E.2d at 883, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 242. The court also noted that
executive branch employees are not an identifiable "suspect class" warranting a higher
level of scrutiny for equal protection analysis. Id. at 612, 554 N.E.2d 882, 555 N.Y.S.2d
241.
324. Id., at 613, 554 N.E.2d at 884, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 243. The court listed, among
other things, the bicameral structure of the Legislature and the close personal accounta-
bility of legislators as a result of biannual elections - neither of which affects most
administrative employees in the executive branch. Id. at 612-13, 554 N.E.2d at 883, 555
N.Y.S.2d at 242.
325. Id. at 614, 554 N.E.2d at 884, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 243.
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made, and the knowledge they obtained, during their State ser-
vice. '  Such restrictions, the court concluded, are "reasonably
related to the legislative goal of restoring public confidence in
government. 327
III. The Court
A. The Figures
The Court of Appeals decided thirty state constitutional
rights cases in 1990.32 8 In each of these cases, a substantial state
constitutional argument was the basis for the court's decision or
was advanced in a concurring or dissenting opinion. The court
was divided 63% of the time. That is, in nineteen of the thirty
cases that involved a substantial state constitutional question,
there was disagreement among the judges on the constitutional
issue.""Table A lists all thirty state constitutional rights cases and
326. Id.
327. Id. The unanimous court also had little difficulty rejecting the equal protection
challenge in Schneider v. Sobol, 76 N.Y.2d 309, 558 N.E.2d 23, 559 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1990),
where the Excellence in Teaching Program, see N.Y. EDUc. LAW §§ 1950(15)(a) (McKin-
ney 1981 & Supp. 1991), 3602(27)(a) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1991), as implemented by
the state education department, see 8 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. § 175.35[e][1][i], was
upheld against claims that it impermissibly discriminated against school administrators
by denying them eligibility for financial supplements that are awarded annually to im-
prove the salaries of full-time teachers. Id. at 317, 558 N.E.2d at 26, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
The court, speaking through Judge Bellacosa, concluded that it was clearly rational to
exclude from the program those who, even though teaching part-time, work primarily as
administrators and are paid under administrative salary schedules - which, according
to the court, are consistently higher than those for teachers. 76 N.Y.2d at 314-15, 558
N.E.2d at 25, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
In Binghamton GHS Employees FCU v. State Div. of Human Rights, 77 N.Y.2d 12,
564 N.E.2d 1051, 563 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1990), the court sustained a claim of gender discrim-
ination, but did so under its interpretation of the State Human Rights Law. See N.Y.
EXEc. LAW § 296-a(1)(McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1991). Noting that it had previously held
that singling out pregnancy for different treatment than other disabilities constitutes
prohibited sex discrimination under the statute, the unanimous court, speaking through
Judge Simons, concededly construed the statute "liberally" to "apply the statutory pro-
scription against discrimination to all provisions of a credit offering, not simply those
which are mandatory," and thus held that a lender may not exclude pregnancy from an
optional disability insurance policy in an automobile loan agreement. Id. at 17-18, 564
N.E.2d at 1053-54, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 387-88.
328. Each of these cases is discussed in Part II, supra notes 7-327 and accompany-
ing text. They are listed in Table A.
329. Figures derived from Table A.
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indicates, for each case, which judges formed the court majority,
who authored the majority opinion if signed, which judges voted
separately on the state constitutional question,330 whether those
judges concurred or dissented in the court's decision, and who
authored the separate opinions. Table A also indicates whether
the case outcome was Liberal3 ' or Conservative.332 Additionally,
Table A breaks the cases down into three categories - criminal
justice, civil liberties, and equality - depending on the nature
of the state constitutional right at issue. 3
Table B shows the number of majority, concurring and dis-
senting opinions written by each member of the court, as well as
the number of unsigned opinions - i.e., per curiam or memo-
randum. Table C breaks down the divided opinions into major-
330. Only those concurrences and dissents that disagree with the majority's resolu-
tion of the state constitutional rights issue are treated as "separate" votes. Hence, in
Cain, Judge Simons is treated as having voted with the majority because he agreed with
the court's resolution of the state constitutional issue; his dissent was based on an unre-
lated, albeit for him dispositive, question. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
331. The terms "liberal" and "conservative" are used herein as they are commonly
understood and employed in judicial studies such as the National Science Foundation's
United States Supreme Court Data Base Project. See Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J.
Spaeth, Decisional Trends on the Warren and Burger Courts: Results From the Su-
preme Court Data Base Project, 73 JUDICATURE 103, 103 (1989); see also Robert Riggs
and Mark Urban, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1989 Term, 5 B.Y.U. J. PuB. L. 1, 10
(1990); David W. Rohde and Harold J. Spaeth, Ideology, Strategy and Supreme Court
Decisions: William Rehnquist as Chief Justice, 72 JUDICATURE 247, 248 n.14 (1989); Rob-
ert Riggs and Mark Urban, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1988 Term, 4 B.Y.U. J. PuB.
L. 1, 10 (1989); Harold J. Spaeth, Burger Court Review of State Court Civil Liberties
Decisions, 68 JUDICATURE 285, 287 (1985).
"Liberal" is thus applied to any decision or vote to uphold rights of criminal justice,
claims of civil liberties, or complaints of discrimination. The term is also applied to deci-
sions or votes in which the recognition, expansion, or extended protection of a state con-
stitutional right or liberty is the overriding significance of the case, regardless of the
particular result for the immediate parties [hereinafter Liberal]. For example, in Dunn,
the court expanded protection against unreasonable searches and seizures by recognizing
canine sniffs as searches and, thus, requiring some reasonable suspicion to justify their
use in the common hallway of an apartment building. Hence, even though the court
ruled against the particular defendant in that case, on the ground that reasonable suspi-
cion had been present, the holding is treated as "liberal" [hereinafter Liberal].
332. See supra note 331. "Conservative" is applied to any decision supporting the
prosecution or the government against claims of criminal or civil rights and liberties
[hereinafter Conservative].
333. Thus, Kern, Green, and Hernandez are treated as "equality" cases, even
though they arose in the context of criminal prosecutions, because the primary question
in each concerned the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. See supra notes 277-
318 and accompanying text.
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ity voting blocs, indicating which members of the court were
with the majority in the 6-1, 5-2, and 4-3 decisions, respectively.
Table C also shows the number of decisions for each majority
voting bloc and indicates how many were Liberal and how many
were Conservative.
Tables D, E and F all deal with the voting patterns of the
individual judges in divided decisions. Table D shows the fre-
quency with which each judge was aligned with the majority and
the number of times each judge voted separately on the state
constitutional question - i.e., either concurred or dissented be-
cause the judge disagreed with the majority's resolution of the
state constitutional rights issue. Table E gives the Liberal/Con-
servative voting record of each judge and of the court itself in
the divided decisions. The decisions are broken down into
''criminal justice" and "civil liberties and equality" categories,
utilizing the same criteria as in Table A. 33" Table F shows the
frequency with which the judges aligned with one another in the
divided decisions. The table gives the number and percentage of
divided cases in which each judge voted with each of the others,
in both majority and separate opinions.
B. Some Observations
A few observations can be made about the Court of Appeals
in state constitutional rights cases in 1990. First, it was a Wach-
tler-Simons court and it was Conservative. To be sure, the
figures in the tables do not reveal whether Chief Judge Wachtler
and Judge Simons, in fact, dominated or led the court; nor do
the figures demonstrate that the court was Conservative in any
absolute sense or as compared to other state high courts
throughout the country. But the figures do show that the deci-
sions of the court almost always coincided with the votes of
Judges Wachtler and Simons and were mostly pro-prosecution
or pro-government.
Judges Wachtler and Simons were each in the majority 93%
of the time.3 35 More significantly, even in the divided decisions
334. See supra notes 331-33 and accompanying text.
335. This figure is derived from Table A. It represents the fact, as shown in that
table, that Judges Wachtler and Simons were each in the court majority in twenty-eight
of the thirty state constitutional rights cases. No other member of the court was in the
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where, presumably, there were legitimate grounds for the court
to resolve the state constitutional issue either way, the court's
decisions coincided with the votes of Judges Wachtler and
Simons 89% of the time.33 6 Moreover, in those divided decisiong
in which Judges Wachtler and Simons voted together, also 89%
of the time,337 the court's decisions coincided with their com-
bined votes in every case but one. 3 '
With regard to the court's Conservativism in 1990, 73% of
the state constitutional cases were decided against the criminal
defendant or the civil rights or liberties claimant.3 3 9 More signif-
icantly, perhaps, in divided decisions - where at least one judge
advanced a substantial argument in support of the state consti-
tutional claim, and thus, where the court could presumably have
reached a reasonable Liberal result - the Court of Appeals ren-
dered a Conservative decision 78% of the time. 4"
The second observation that can readily be made concerns
the opposite poles of the court's Liberal/Conservative spectrum.
Just as clearly as Judges Wachtler and Simons seem to reflect
the court itself, Judge Titone represents its Liberal flank and
Judge Bellacosa its most Conservative. For example, in divided
criminal justice cases, Judge Titone voted to uphold the asserted
right of the accused 92% of the time. Judge Bellacosa's record
was exactly the opposite - he voted for the prosecution in 92%
majority as frequently.
336. See Table D. Eighty-nine percent represents seventeen of the nineteen divided
decisions. Again, no other member of the court was in the majority as frequently.
337. See Table F. This is the highest figure for any two judges on the Court. Eighty-
nine percent represents seventeen of the nineteen divided decisions; these seventeen de-
cisions are not identical to the'seventeen in which Judges Wachtler and Simons, respec-
tively, voted with the majority. See discussion of Dunn, supra notes 81-98 and accompa-
nying text, and discussion of Seelig, supra notes 223-41 and accompanying text.
338. The only state constitutional rights case in which Judges Wachtler and Simons
voted together but were not in the majority was Vilardi, see supra notes 163-81 and
accompanying text.
339. This figure is derived from Table A.
340. See Table E. Notably, this figure is identical to that for Chief Judge Wachtler.
Moreover, as shown in Table F, every member of the court, except Judge Titone, was
aligned with Chief Judge Wachtler in a high percentage of the divided decisions, espe-
cially Judges Simons (89%) and Kaye (73%). Likewise, for Judge Simons, especially
Judges Wachtler (89%) and Bellacosa (78%). Contrast these figures, for example, with
the alignment figures in Table F for Judges Titone and Bellacosa, (11%), and for Judges
Simons and Titone, (32%).
[Vol. 12:1
50http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss1/1
COURT OF APPEALS
of the cases, or in every case but one. 4 In all divided cases
(criminal justice as well as civil liberties and equality), Judge
Titone's record was 83% in favor of the rights and liberties
claimants, while Judge Bellacosa's was 94% in support of the
prosecution or government.-2
Not surprisingly, Judges Titone and Bellacosa voted to-
gether in only 11% of the divided decisions, by far the lowest
figure within the court.3 4' Also, although typically on opposite
sides in divided cases, Judges Titone and Bellacosa were the
most prolific members of the court. Judge Titone authored a to-
tal of twelve opinions, majority and separate.3 44 Judge Bellacosa
authored a total of nine; he also expressed a separate view in two
entries. 4 5 Additionally, Judge Bellacosa wrote the most majority
opinions among his colleagues - six. His output was exceeded
only by the number of opinions that were unsigned - eight.34 6
The three remaining judges on the court, Kaye, Alexander
and Hancock, each had a record evenly divided between Liberal
and Conservative votes in non-unanimous court decisions.3 47
Though the three are situated at the center of the court's Lib-
eral - Conservative spectrum and potentially comprise the
court's "swing" block, they voted together in only 42% of the
divided cases.34 8 Judges Hancock and Alexander voted together
72% of the time, more than either of them did with any other
member of the court.34 9 Judge Kaye, however, voted fairly
evenly with most of the court. She was with Judges Simons and
Titone each approximately 60% of the time; that is as fre-
quently as she was with either Alexander or Hancock.3 50 She
341. See Table E. The court's record in criminal justice cases was 69%
Conservative.
342. See id. By comparison, the court's overall record was 78% Conservative.
343. See id.
344. See Table B. Judge Titone wrote four majority opinions, one concurrence, and
seven dissents.
345. See id. Judge Bellacosa wrote six majority opinions, three dissents, and noted a
separate view in two concurring entries.
346. See id.
347. See Table E. Judges Kaye and Hancock both voted 50%-50%; Judge Alexan-
der voted 53% Conservative.
348. This figure is derived from Table A. It represents seven of the nineteen divided
decisions.
349. See' Table F.
350. See id.
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voted most frequently with Chief Judge Wachtler, in 73% of the
divided cases, and least with Judge Bellacosa, 42%. 851
Finally, as should be evident from the foregoing, the ideo-
logical spectrum of the court as a whole was clear for 1990.
Judge Titone was, by a wide margin, the court's most Liberal
member - i.e., the most sympathetic to assertions of state con-
stitutional rights. 2 Judges Kaye, Hancock and Alexander voted
equally for rights claimants and the government.3 53 Chief Judge
Wachtler and the Judges Simons and Bellacosa were signifi-
cantly pro-prosecution and pro-government in their voting,354
with Judge Bellacosa being the most supportive of the prosecu-
tion and the government among his colleagues.
C. Conclusion
Clearly, there was no dearth of significant state constitu-
tional case law at the Court of Appeals in 1990, nor of revealing
voting patterns of the judges and the court itself. The court ren-
dered decisions that will have great impact throughout the
state - and, likely, considerable influence elsewhere. The court
also provided abundant grist for commentary. This Review con-
cludes with three general, personal impressions - one positive,
one negative and one neutral. To end on a positive note, they
are discussed in reverse order.
First, the neutral: -the court is "retrenching." Like the Su-
preme Court in the Burger-Rehnquist era, the Court of Appeals
is cutting back on prior Liberal precedents.35 5 This is not neces-
sarily an unfortunate development. How one views the court's
retrenchment depends, of course, on whether one believes the
precedents being curtailed - or even overruled - were rightly
351. See id.
352. See Table E. Judge Titone's voting record in divided decisions was 83%
Liberal.
353. See id. Judge Kaye's and Judge Hancock's voting records were each 50%-50%;
Judge Alexander, who participated in one less case, voted 53% Conservative.
354. See id. Chief Judge Wachtler's voting record in divided decisions was 78%
Conservative; Judge Simons' was 87%; Judge Bellacosa's was 94%. The court, like Chief
Judge Wachtler, was 78% Conservative.
355. This "retrenchment" did not begin in 1990, but has been noticeable over the
last three or four years. See generally Bonventre, State Constitutional Recession: The
New York Court of Appeals Retrenches, 4 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 1 (1991).
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or wrongly decided in the first instance, or subsequently proved
themselves workable or not. But regardless of the substantive
merits of individual decisions, it can scarcely be disputed that
the court is, in fact, "retrenching." To be sure, the court contin-
ues, on occasion, to extend the limits of state constitutional pro-
tections. 56 But those instances, as the figures emphatically con-
firm,367 are quite infrequent exceptions.
In some cases, the court's retrenchment is explicit, or other-
wise obvious. For example, in Bing, the court expressly over-
ruled a protective right-to-counsel rule.3 58 In Seelig, the court, as
the dissenters made clear, relaxed its prior restrictions on suspi-
cionless drug testing.3 59
In other decisions, the retrenchment was somewhat less ap-
parent, but no less real. For example, in Davis, the court, with-
out a dissenting opinion to point it out, significantly limited the
protection against custodial waivers of the right to counsel.360
And in Carter, the court refused to overturn convictions ob-
tained by a non-attorney prosecutor - a result that may well
comport with good reason and practicality, but one that, as the
dissent showed, contravened the unequivocal language of an ear-
lier, and perhaps overstated, unsigned decision of the court. 361
That leads to the second - the negative - impression:
the court often decided substantial state constitutional cases in
unsigned opinions. There may, perhaps, be nothing intrinsically
wrong with an anonymous opinion - per curiam or memoran-
dum. But there certainly is, when the absence of a signature also
means an inadequate, poorly reasoned or sloppily written deci-
sion. And there certainly is, when a dissenting opinion raises le-
gitimate constitutional questions which the unsigned majority
fails to address, or fails to address thoughtfully.
Indeed, it is not difficult to understand why opinions whose
authors remain unnamed might tend to be less carefully consid-
ered and crafted than those that are signed. In 1990, fully one-
356. See e.g., Dunn, supra notes 81-98 and accompanying text; Vilardi, supra notes
163-81 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 339-40 and accompanying text. See also Tables A and E.
358. See supra notes 10-34 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 223-41 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
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third of the divided decisions of the Court of Appeals in cases
raising a substantial state constitutional rights issue were ren-
dered in an unsigned writing. 62 Most of those writings, to be
kind, were unworthy of a distinguished tribunal.
For example, in Sirno, over a vigorous lone dissent, the
court, in an anonymously written, superficial, one-paragraph
memorandum, held that a defendant had knowingly, intelli-
gently and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights - the court
relying on the remarkable proposition that the defendant's "co-
operation" with his interrogators could mean nothing else.36 3
Likewise, in Green, where the court held that claims of racial
discrimination in jury selection, like most other claims of trial
error, are waived upon a guilty plea, the court rendered its deci-
sion in a conclusory, one-page memorandum, devoid of much
analysis and of any fair response to the strenuous lengthy
dissent. "
Last, on a positive note: in many of its 1990 decisions, the
court did demonstrate why it is among the nation's most highly
regarded tribunals. 65 In cases such as Bing,""6 where the court
broke with its own right-to-counsel rule, and Vilardi, e7 where it
broke with the Supreme Court's rule on exculpatory evidence,
the Court of Appeals treated the issues comprehensively, analyt-
ically and thoughtfully, in logical, clear and frank discussions of
the pros and cons. In both Bing and Vilardi, the court was di-
vided. In both cases, the authors of the majority and separate
opinions confronted the issues directly, spelled out the perceived
weaknesses and ramifications of each other's positions, and
reached conclusions based upon elaborated reasons - not upon
verbal legerdemain or mere disregard or disdain for contrary ar-
guments advanced by a colleague or by one of the parties.
The outcome in Bing was Conservative; that in Vilardi Lib-
362. Figure derived from Table A. The precise numbers were six unsigned opinions
out of the eighteen divided decisions in which there was a Liberal/Conservative division
on the state constitutional issue. See Table E.
363. See supra notes 114-25 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 308-18 and accompanying text.
365. See Bonventre, supra note 1, at 31-32 n. 3. See also Kolbert, supra note 5, at
Al.
366. See supra notes 10-34 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 163-81 and accompanying text.
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eral. But whatever one's ideological or jurisprudential prefer-
ences, and however else one might feel about the relative merits
of the majority and dissenting opinions in those cases, one can-
not help but be impressed with the care and candor of the expo-
sition therein. It is on the strength of opinions such as these,
regardless of the Liberal or Conservative result in particular
cases, that the author believes the New York Court of Appeals
to be the nation's premier state tribunal.318
TABLE A
List of Cases
HOLDING* MAJORITY** SEPARATE**
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Bing C SWHB (K) A T
Brooks L Unsigned Unanimous
Cain*** L TWSKAH [B]
Carter C HWSKB [T] A
Centano C WSKB [T] A H
Cintron L HWSKT (A) [B]
Davis C S, Unanimous
Dunn**** L TWKAH (S) (B)
Gonzales C WSKATH [B]
Harris C WSAHB [T] K
Hults C AWSKB [H] T
LaClere L B, Unanimous
Menchetti C A, Unanimous
Moisett C Unsigned Unanimous
Natal C K, Unanimous
Scalza C BWSKAH [T]
Sirno C WSKAHB [T]
Van Pelt L B, Unanimous
Vilardi L KATH (S) W B
Wicks C WSAHB [T] K
368. For the reader who deems it helpful to know the author's predilections, the
author is a moderately Conservative Democrat - somewhat Conservative in criminal
justice, and somewhat Liberal in civil liberties and equality. Excluding Judge Hancock,
for whom the author clerked during part of 1990, the author's overall Liberal/Conserva-
tive percentages would most closely resemble those of Chief Judge Wachtler, see Table
E. The author's percentages would be slightly less Conservative. See William O. Douglas,
Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. REv. 227 (1965).
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CIVIL LIBERTIES
Golden C SWKAB [H] T
Johnson Newspaper C H, Unanimous
Motor Vehicle
Mfr. Ass'n. C SWKAHB [T]
Savastano***** C TWSKAH (B)
Seelig C BSAH [W]KT
EQUALITY
Forti
Green
Hernandez******
Kern
Schneider
T, Unanimous
WSKTB
BWST
A, Unanimous
B, Unanimous
* "L" indicates a Liberal holding; "C" a Conservative holding. See supra notes 331-
32.
** A judge's named underlined indicates that he or she was the author of the major-
ity opinion, in brackets the dissent and in parentheticals, a concurrence.
*** In Cain, see supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text, Judge Simons agreed with
the majority on the state constitutional issue; he dissented on the basis of an unrelated
question.
See supra notes 81-98 and accompanying text.
* In Savastano, see supra notes 242-59, the court's holding was Conservative in
rejecting the state constitutional claim; Judge Bellacosa's concurring entry was more
Conservative, rejecting the notion that a constitutional right was even implicated.
****** Judge Alexander did not participate in the Hernandez decision. See supra notes
292-307 and accompanying text.
[H] A
[K] H
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TABLE B
Authorship of Opinions
W S K A T H B UNSIGNED
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Majority 0 2 2 2 .2 2 3 7
Concurrence 0 1* 1 1 0 0 0*
Dissent 0 0 0 0 6 1 ' 3
Total 0 3* 3 3 8 3 6* 7
CIVIL LIBERTIES
AND EQUALITY
Majority 0 2 0 1 2 1 3 1
Concurrence 0 0 0 0 1 0 0*
Dissent 1 0 1 0 1 2 0
TOTAL 1 2 1 1 4 3 3* 1
ALL DECISIONS
Majority 0 4 2 3 4 3 6 8
Concurrence 0 1* 1 1 1 0 0**
Dissent 1 0 1 0 7 3 3
Total 1 5* 4 4 12 6 9** 8
* plus one entry
• * plus two entry
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TABLE C
Majority Voting Blocks
6-1 DECISIONS
Judges in Majority Number of Decisions Liberal Conservative
WSKATH 3 1 2
WSKAHB 3 0 3
Total 6 1 (17%) 5 (83%)
Cases: Gonzales, Sirno, Savastano*, Motor Vehicles Mgf. Ass'n., Cain**
5-2 DECISIONS
Judges in Majority Number of Decisions Liberal Conservative
WSKAB 2 2
WSKTH 1 1
WSKTB 1 1
WSKHB 1 1
WSAHB 2 2
WKATH 1 1
Total 8 2 (25%) 6 (75%)
Cases: Wicks, Hults, Dunn, Carter, Golden, Green, Cintron
4-3 DECISIONS
Judges in Majority Number of Decisions Liberal Conservative
WSKB 1 1
WSTB 1 1
WSHB 1 1
SAHB 1 1
KATH 1 1
Total 5 1 (20%) 4 (80%)
Cases: Bing, Centano, Vilardi, Seelig, Hernandez
* See supra Table A, note on Savastano.
** See supra Table A, note on Cain
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TABLE D
Alignment with Majority
(Divided Decisions)
Wachtler
Simons
Kaye
Alexander
Titone
Hancock
Bellacosa
Majority
17 (89%)
17 (89%)
14 (74%)
13 (72%)
8 (42%)
14 (74%)
13 (68%)
Separate*
2 (11%)
2 (11%)
5 (26%)
5 (28%)
11 (58%)
5 (26%)
6 (32%)
* A judge is deemed to have cast a "separate" vote only if the judge disagreed with the
majority on the substantial state constitutional issue in a case. Hence, for example, in
Cain, see supra Table A, Judge Simons is deemed to have voted with the majority.
TABLE E
Ideological Voting Patterns
(Divided Decisions)*
W S K A T H B COURT
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Liberal 23% (3) 15% (2) 54% (7) 54% (7) 92% (12) 46% (6) 8% (1) 31% (4)
Conservative 77% (10) 85% (11) 46% (6) 46% (6) 8% (1) 54% (7) 92% (12) 69% (9)
CIVIL LIBERTIES
AND EQUALITY
Liberal 20% (1) 0% 40% (2) 25% (1)* 60% (3) 60% (3) 0% 0%
Conservative 80% (4) 100% (5) 60% (3) 75% (3)** 40% (2) 40% (2) 100% (5) 100% (5)
TOTAL
Liberal 22% (4) 11% (2) 50% (9) 47% (8)** 83% (15)
Conservative 78% (14) 89% (16) 50% (9) 53% (9)** 17% (3)
50% (9) 6% (1) 22% (4)
50% (9) 94% (17) 78% (14)
* For the purposes of this table only, Savastano, supra notes 242-59, is not included
among the "divided decisions". Although Judge Bellacosa's concurring entry was argua-
bly more Conservative than the majority opinion, both were decidedly Conservative and
no Liberal/Conservative division can fairly be identified.
** Judge Alexander did not participate in the Hernandez decision. See supra notes 292-
307 and accompanying text.
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TABLE F
Individual Voting Alignments
(Number of Times Judges Voted with Each Other in
Divided Decisions)*
W S K A T H B
Majority 84% (16) 68% (13) 61% (11) 39% (7) 63% (12) 63% (12)
Wachtler Separate 5% (1) 5% (1) 0% (0) 5% (1) 0% (0) 5% (1)
Total 89% (17) 73% (14) 61% (11) 42% (8) 63% (12) 68% (13)
Majority 84% (16) 63% (12) 61% (11) 32% (6) 63% (12) 68% (13)
Simons Separate 5% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 11% (2)
Total 89% (17) 63% (12) 61% (11) 32% (6) 63% (12) 78% (15)
Majority 68% (13) 63% (12) 56% (10) 37% (7) 53% (10) 42% (8)
Kaye Separate 5% (1) 0% (0) 6% (1) 21% (4) 5% (1) 0% (0)
Total 73% (14) 63% (12) 61% (11) 58% (11) 58% (11) 42% (8)
Majority 61% (11) 61% (11) 56% (10) 28% (5) 61% (11) 44% (8)
Alexander Separate 0% (0) 0% (0) 6% (1) 16%" (3) 11% (2) 0% (0)
Total 61% (11) 61% (11) 61% (11) 44% (8) 72% (13) 44% (8)
Majority 37% (7) 32% (6) 37% (7) 28% (5) 32% (6) 11% (2)
Titone Separate 5% (1) 0% (0) 21% (4) 16% (3) 16% (3) 0% (0)
Total 42% (8) 32% (6) 58% (11) 44% (8) 47% (9) 11% (2)
Majority 63% (12) 63% (12) 53% (10) 61% (11) 32% (6) 42% (8)
Hancock Separate 0% (0) 0% (0) 5% (1) 11% (2) 16% (3) 0% (0)
Total 63% (12) 63% (12) 58% (11) 72% (13) 47% (9) 42% (8)
Majority 63% (12) 68% (13) 42% (8) 44% (8) 11% (2) 42% (8)
Bellacosa Separate 5% (1) 11% (2) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0)
Total 68% (13) 78% (15) 42% (8) 44% (8) 11% (2) 42% (8)
* The percentages represent the proportion of divided decisions in which the judges
voted together; the number is the number of divided decisions, out of a total of nineteen,
in which the judges voted together.
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